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We address a crucial but underappreciated question: what else besides 
corporate law matters for corporate governance?  We take the novel view that 
corporate governance must involve more than corporate law.  Corporate 
scholars focus almost exclusively on corporate law mechanisms for controlling 
managerial agency costs.  We contend, however, that contracting parties also 
attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm.  In particular, 
we hypothesize that banks, by monitoring firms in connection with their loans, 
enhance firm value for the benefit of shareholders. 
We examine over one-thousand public firms for the period 1990-2004 to test 
the value of bank monitoring.  Our approach builds on existing empirical 
scholarship on corporate governance, to which we add data on the presence of 
bank loans and their interactions with free cash flow, governance indices, and 
individual corporate governance provisions.  We find evidence consistent with 
our hypothesis that bank monitoring improves firm value, especially where 
agency costs are high.  Bank monitoring may provide an additional mechanism 
for corporate governance. 
Our findings have important implications for both regulatory design and 
corporate governance.  Bank monitoring may offer positive spillovers not 
previously considered in the crafting of regulation affecting bank lending, 
creditor rights, and the operation of loan and credit derivatives markets.  
Legal rules affecting bank lending or monitoring may indirectly and 
inadvertently affect firm value, a nontrivial consideration given the 
pervasiveness of bank debt among public companies.  We identify a number of 
regulatory areas that may deserve new attention.  Similarly, future empirical 
corporate governance research should account for the effects of bank 
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[C]reditor control has yet to hit the radar screen of the general corporate 
governance literature.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law matters.  But it may not be all that matters. 
Several decades of empirical research have generated consensus that good 
governance improves firm value, thereby benefiting public company 
shareholders.
2
  Corporate law may not be the only thing that matters, though.  
Other parties besides shareholders care about controlling managerial agency 
costs.  Contracting parties of the firm may therefore be expected to contract for 
agency cost constraints and to monitor management.  A well-developed 
finance literature shows banks to be especially adept at this monitoring 
function.  And while the interests of banks and shareholders may not be 
perfectly aligned, we hypothesize that the overlap is sufficiently large that 
bank monitoring may improve firm value for the benefit of shareholders.  We 
seek to address a yawning gap in the corporate governance literature, which to 
date has largely ignored the prospects and possibilities for creditor governance.  
Our empirical analysis of publicly traded U.S. firms for the period 1990-2004 
supports our hypothesis that bank monitoring adds value for shareholders. 
Corporate law scholars have long assumed that corporate law does and 
should take the laboring oar for improving firm value and shareholder returns.  
Moreover, two decades of empirical research confirms that good governance 
adds value for shareholders.  Researchers began by examining the effect of 
specific governance arrangements – poison pills, golden parachutes, or the 
composition of boards of directors, for example – on firm performance and 
shareholder wealth.3  Building on these early efforts, subsequent empirical 
scholarship has attempted to capture the broad contours of firms’ governance 
structures with multi-factor governance indices.
4
  An index identifies particular 
governance provisions of interest and then scores firms based on the presence 
or absence of these provisions in firms’ governance arrangements.  Broad-
index approaches – tracking dozens of specific governance provisions – have 
led to narrow-index approaches, attempting to identify a relative handful of 
governance provisions that matter.5 
Corporate law scholars have generally not looked much beyond corporate 
law and markets for mechanisms to reduce agency costs.  They have largely 
 
1 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1242 (2006). 
 
2  See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003) (finding a relationship between an index 
of corporate governance measures and stock performance during the 1990s). 
3 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 
4
  See Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 109. 
5 See infra Part I.A. 
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ignored the possibility that creditor monitoring might improve public company 
firm value.6  While a few scholars have examined creditor monitoring, they 
focus primarily on the distress context – creditors’ ability to affect corporate 
governance once the firm is in serious trouble.  Our claim is broader.  We 
believe bank monitoring has more general value for firms even outside the 
narrow default context. 
The dearth of attention from corporate scholars is ironic given the 
ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal 
academy and the thick web of contractual commitments that bind the public 
company.7  Stockholders are not the only claimants on the firm concerned 
about managerial slack.  Other contracting parties have reason to worry about 
agency costs.  It makes sense, therefore, to investigate the possibility of 
contractual governance arrangements – institutional monitoring arrangements 
outside the traditional purview of corporate law created by explicit contract.  It 
should not be surprising if a firm’s contracts include devices for monitoring 
management and otherwise constraining agency costs.  Corporate governance 
may involve more than corporate law.  We investigate firms’ bank debt to see 
whether this might be true. 
Banks look to be an especially promising source of monitoring services for 
shareholders.  A well-developed finance literature explains banks’ special 
monitoring abilities.8  Largely apart from the shareholder-focused empirical 
corporate governance literature, finance scholars have pursued another line of 
research exploring financial intermediation and its positive externalities for 
other financial claimants.9  Of special interest to us, studies imply that bank 
loans benefit the borrower firm’s shareholders.  Event studies have consistently 
found positive abnormal stock returns to borrower firms upon the public 
announcement of bank loans.10  One explanation for this stock price effect is 
 
6 Law scholars have extensively analyzed the role of banks in the governance of small 
firms.  See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 901, 903-04 (1986). 
7 George Triantis and Ron Daniels offer a prominent exception.  They raised the 
possibility over a decade ago that a bank lender’s monitoring of its borrower firm might 
benefit the firm’s claimants generally.  See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The 
Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1113 (1995).  
Only recently have other law scholars begun to follow this lead, focusing on the effects of 
creditor control on corporate governance.  See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 
1212 (discussing the central role of loan covenants in corporate governance). 
8 See infra Part I.B.2. 
9 See, e.g., Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the 
Pricing of Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 448 (1999) (finding empirical 
evidence that bank debt significantly lowers the monitoring costs of arms-length debt); 
Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Does Corporate Governance 
Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITIVE ANALYSIS 693, 694 (2005). 
10 See Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative Information Sources and the Information 
Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. FIN. 1507, 1512 (1993); Matthew T. Billett, Mark J. Flannery 
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that banks perform a monitoring function not otherwise available.  Because 
shareholders value this bank monitoring, they bid up the price of the firm’s 
stock.11 
Despite the findings of these studies and the intensive empirical focus on 
corporate governance, to date no study has attempted to measure effects of 
bank debt on firm value, or to investigate the interaction of ongoing bank 
monitoring with traditional corporate governance arrangements.  We 
hypothesize that if bank monitoring explains at least part of the observed 
positive market reaction to bank loan announcements, then we should observe 
improved firm value as a result of bank monitoring.  We also suspect that bank 
monitoring may interact with certain corporate governance features, either 
complementing or substituting for good corporate governance.  Finance 
theorists noted long ago the various agency costs that different financial claims 
may create.12  It makes sense, therefore, that financial claimants may attempt to 
control agency costs in their contracts with firms.  And while finance theorists 
often emphasize the conflicting interests among different types of financial 
claims,13 surely debt and equity must share some interest in reducing 
managerial slack.  We hypothesize that over a wide range of situations, the 
interests of lenders and equity holders may converge in reducing managerial 
agency costs.  In short, bank monitoring may provide value for shareholders. 
How might bank monitoring control agency costs?  The standard loan 
agreement imposes numerous operating and financial constraints on the 
borrower firm.14  The borrower is also typically required to maintain a regular 
flow of information to the bank, detailing the borrower’s operating 
performance and current financial condition.  In addition to these contractual 
 
& Jon A. Garfinkel, The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return, 50 
J. FIN. 699, 717 (1995); Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank 
Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 234 (1987); Myron B. Slovin, Shane A. Johnson & John L. 
Glascock, Firm Size and the Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1070 (1992). 
11 The other standard explanation is that banks resolve information asymmetry for capital 
markets when they decide to lend to a firm.  Bank lenders may obtain private information 
about the firm during the process of negotiating the lending arrangement.  Their 
consummation of an agreement conveys positive private information to the market about the 
firm’s value.  Neither explanation – monitoring or information asymmetry – excludes the 
other.  Both may be at work.  See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the supporting finance 
literature). 
12 For the seminal work in this regard, see Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 312-30 (1976). 
13 Jensen and Meckling model the agency costs of debt as increasing in the percentage of 
outside financing comprised of debt versus equity.  See id. at 344-45. 
14 As for operational constraints, negative covenants may prohibit many types of 
transactions without the bank’s consent.  Financial covenants may require the borrower firm 
to maintain a healthy financial condition.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
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requirements, banks enjoy institutional features that facilitate monitoring.  For 
example, a bank lender often requires its borrower to maintain its deposit 
accounts with the bank, an arrangement that enables the bank to monitor its 
borrower’s cash flow.  Bank lending practices – such as short terms and 
specialization by industry – also facilitate monitoring.   
Our paper marries two strands of literature – the empirical corporate 
governance literature and the corporate finance literature – to investigate the 
effect of bank monitoring on firm value.  We find evidence consistent with our 
bank monitoring theory,15 especially where agency costs are high.  Controlling 
for governance indices and for potential simultaneity, we consistently find a 
positive and significant relation between firm value and the presence of a bank 
loan.  This suggests that bank monitoring can help counteract the value-
decreasing effect of managerial entrenchment.  In addition, using measures of 
free cash flow to differentiate companies with high agency costs, we find that 
bank monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm value, and that 
this effect is greater for firms with substantial free cash flow.  Finally, we test 
interactions among bank loans, free cash flow, and measures of governance 
quality.  Our results suggest that (a) for a given quality of corporate 
governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring improves firm 
value; and (b) bank monitoring may matter most when strong entrenchment 
would otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash – i.e., when agency 
costs are high. 
The significant potential for bank governance may implicate a number of 
bank- and credit-market-related regulatory design issues, as well as the design 
of future empirical corporate governance research.  By improving firm value, 
bank monitoring may offer a beneficial spillover not previously accounted for 
in the crafting of regulation affecting bank lending, creditor rights, or the 
operation of loan and credit derivatives markets.  To the extent legal rules may 
facilitate or impede bank lending or monitoring, they may also indirectly and 
inadvertently affect firm value.  Given the pervasiveness of bank debt among 
public companies, this effect is likely to be nontrivial.  Accordingly, we 
identify a number of regulatory areas that may deserve new attention.  
Similarly, future empirical corporate governance research should both account 
for the effects of bank governance and further investigate its potential for 
improving firm value. 
Part I of this Article reviews the relevant corporate and finance literature.  
First, it sketches the empirical corporate governance literature, describing 
scholars’ attempts to identify what counts as good traditional corporate 
governance and to measure its value.  Part I then turns to the literature 
suggesting the possibilities for bank governance.  Part II develops our 
 
15 Following existing empirical studies on the value of corporate governance, see infra 
Part I.A, we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm value.  Tobin’s Q is 
defined as the firm’s market value divided by the replacement cost of its assets.  See infra 
Part III.A.3 for our formula for calculating Tobin’s Q. 
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hypotheses.  Part III outlines our methodology for measuring the effects of 
bank governance.  It then discusses our findings.  Part IV discusses the 
implications of our findings for future research. 
I. BACKGROUND 
For decades, corporate scholars have argued over optimal corporate 
governance provisions for public companies.16  There is now widespread 
consensus that corporate law matters.17  Empirical studies confirm that 
corporate governance arrangements affect shareholder value.18 
With just a handful of exceptions discussed below, corporate law scholars 
have focused almost exclusively on corporate law and markets for mechanisms 
to reduce agency costs in public companies.19  Law scholars have not much 
 
16 For over thirty years, corporate scholars have debated whether corporate charter 
competition benefits investors or only self-serving firm managers.  Classic race-to-the-top 
works include FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 214 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The 
Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. 
BUS. L. 259, 281 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections 
on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 914 
(1982); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977).  Race-to-
the-bottom scholarship includes Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: 
The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 
1509 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1524 (1989); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 852 (1995) (suggesting network effects 
may impede the race to the top); cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an 
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987) 
(describing the role of the Delaware corporate bar in influencing Delaware corporate law). 
17 But see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (arguing that corporate law rules that appear to 
be mandatory are trivial, either because they mimic the parties’ desires anyway, they can 
easily be planned around, they are unimportant, or political pressures will cause their 
modification in the long run). 
18 See infra Part I.A. 
19 Besides bank credit agreements, scholars have also identified bond indentures and 
directors’ and officers’ insurance policies as promising or potential sources of contract-
based agency cost constraints.  See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial 
Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 125-31 (1979) (explaining the role of bond covenants in 
incentivizing shareholders to pursue a firm-value-maximizing investment policy); Tom 
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 543 (2007) 
(surveying D&O insurance underwriters who overwhelmingly view corporate governance 
arrangements as important for assessing liability risk, and hypothesizing that higher 
  
998 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:991 
 
discussed the possibility that creditor monitoring might improve public 
company firm value.20  By contrast, a well-developed finance literature 
explains banks’ special monitoring abilities and suggests that equity holders 
may also benefit.
21
  To date, however, no one has attempted to measure the 
effects of bank monitoring on the traditional indicia of firm value that have 
been the focus of empirical corporate governance research. 
This Part briefly reviews the literature relevant to our investigation.  Section 
A describes the empirical corporate governance literature, which forms the 
backdrop for our empirical analysis.  We take as given the major findings of 
this literature that corporate governance adds value.  We rely on several 
accepted corporate governance measures in our models, either as controls or 
interaction variables.  Section B discusses the extant legal and finance 
literature suggesting that bank monitoring may have value for shareholders.  
As described below, the empirical corporate governance literature and the bank 
cross-monitoring research have developed largely in isolation from one 
another. 
A. Corporate Governance Through Corporate Law: The Empirical 
Corporate Governance Literature 
Legal and finance scholars have attempted to measure the value of corporate 
law and various corporate governance features, generally relying on stock 
market-based metrics.  Focusing on the race-to-the-top debate,22 Robert Daines 
and Guhan Subramanian have each attempted to measure the effect of 
Delaware corporate law on firm value.23  Others have investigated the effects 
of specific corporate governance arrangements on stock prices and firm 
performance.24 
 
insurance premiums for higher risk firms may serve to deter managerial misbehavior).  But 
see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1841-42 (2007) (finding that 
D&O insurers do not offer loss prevention services or otherwise monitor corporate 
governance). 
20 Law scholars have, however, extensively analyzed the role of banks in the governance 
of small firms.  See Scott, supra note 6, at 903-04. 
 
21  See infra Part I.B.2. 
22 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
23 Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 556 
(2001) (finding evidence consistent with the theory that Delaware corporate law improves 
firm value); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
32, 57 (2004) (finding that the “Delaware effect” is limited to small firms during the period 
1991-1996 but not afterward, and not for larger firms).  Both use Tobin’s Q as their metric 
for firm value.  See Daines, supra, at 525; Subramanian, supra, at 36. 
24 See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the 
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 101, 121 (1985) (finding that board independence is positively correlated with firm 
performance); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. 
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Then Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (GIM) devised their G-
index,25 attempting a comprehensive measure of governance quality.26  The G-
index tracks governance provisions on shareholder voting, director-officer 
protections, managers’ latitude to delay hostile bidders, and other takeover 
defenses, among other things.  GIM find a significant inverse correlation 
between management entrenchment and firm value and performance, using 
Tobin’s Q, stock returns, and operating performance as their dependent 
variables.27  Other corporate governance studies relying on the G-index 
followed.28  Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allan Ferrell (BCF) refine the 
GIM approach.  Instead of canvassing the entire range of corporate governance 
items, BCF focus on a subset of the G-index.  They identify six provisions they 
claim to be the most significant in terms of management entrenchment.29  
These six provisions – staggered boards, limits to bylaw amendments, limits to 
charter amendments, supermajority voting for mergers, golden parachutes, and 
poison pills – form their E-index.30  Like GIM, BCF find a significant inverse 
correlation between their E-index and performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q 
 
FIN. ECON. 409, 432 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Cohen, Entrenched Boards] 
(concluding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value); John E. Core, 
Robert W. Holthausen & David Larcker, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer 
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 403 (1999); Richard Lambert 
& David Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth, 
7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 201 (1985) (suggesting that Golden Parachute adoption is 
associated with a positive and statistically significant market reaction); Michael Ryngaert, 
The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377, 411 
(1988) (finding that poison pill plans do not benefit shareholders). 
25 Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 144. 
26 The G-index rates companies based on their degree of management entrenchment as 
indicated by twenty-four separate corporate governance features tracked by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).  Id. at 111.  A firm’s G-index score simply reflects 
the number of IRRC governance features each firm has in place that increase managerial 
control and correspondingly reduce shareholder rights.  Id. at  114.  IRRC, formerly an 
independent proxy advisory service used primarily by institutional investors, is now a part 
of RiskMetrics Group. 
27 GIM use profit margin, return on equity, and sales growth as their measures of 
operating performance.  Id. at 129.  GIM’s findings on stock returns have been challenged.  
See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause 
Weak Stock Returns?: An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investor 
Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 685 (2006). 
28 See, e.g., K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity 
Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2864 (2005); Klock et al., supra note 9, at 694. 
29 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance? 19 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center, Working Paper No. 491,  
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What 
Matters]. 
30 Each firm’s E-index for a given year is simply the number of E-index entrenchment 
mechanisms the firm has in place in that year.  Id. at 2. 
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and stock returns.31  Other studies have followed, proposing new governance 
indices.32  Though varied in their specific governance focus, the studies 
confirm that good governance improves firm value. 
 
31 Id. at 39-40.  Subsequent studies by Bhagat & Bolton and Core, Guay & Rusticus 
found no correlation between governance measures and stock returns, contrary to GIM and 
BCF. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance  30 
(June 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017342; Core 
et. al, supra note 27, at 685.  These studies did, however, confirm the correlation between 
good governance and operating performance.  Bhagat & Bolton, supra, at 6 (finding that 
good governance – as measured by the G-index, the E-index, stock ownership of board 
members, and the separation of CEO and chairman of the board – is significantly and 
positively correlated with operating performance but not stock performance);  Core et al., 
supra note 27, at 684-86 (finding that in the 1990s, weak shareholder rights were associated 
with poor operating performance but not poor stock returns).  In addition, Bhagat and 
Bolton find a negative correlation between board independence and operating performance.  
Bhagat & Bolton, supra, at 30. 
32 For example, scholars have recently constructed indices based on governance 
attributes tracked by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) testing both broad-based 
indices and sub-indices that more carefully identify which governance features matter.  See 
Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 411 (2006); Reena Aggarwal and Rohan Williamson, Did New 
Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 3 (Feb. 12, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264. 
 Brown and Caylor develop their Gov-Score index based on fifty-one ISS governance 
attributes.  Brown & Caylor, supra, at 411.  After showing a positive association between 
Gov-Score and firm value, they whittle the index down to seven “key drivers” of their 
result, which they aggregate in their Gov-7 index.  Id.  The seven key factors are: (1) board 
members are elected annually; (2) company either has no poison pill or a pill that was 
shareholder approved; (3) option re-pricing did not occur within the last three years; (4) 
average options granted in the past three years as a percent of basic shares outstanding did 
not exceed three percent; (5) all directors attend at least seventy-five percent of board 
meetings or had a valid excuse for non-attendance; (6) board guidelines are in each proxy 
statement; and (7) directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines.  Id. 
 Aggarwal and Williamson offer another set of ISS-based governance measures.  Their 
Gov64 index aggregates all sixty-four governance attributes tracked by ISS, scoring each 
firm by the number of ISS governance features the firm has in place.  Aggarwal & 
Williamson, supra, at 1.  Using Gov64 as their measure of governance, they find a positive 
association between good governance and firm value, which is both statistically and 
economically significant.  Id. at 18.  They also sort their sixty-four governance features into 
eight categories – Board (relating to board structure and function), Audit (the audit 
committee and the role of auditors), State (state law anti-takeover provisions), Charter 
(charter-based anti-takeover devices), Compensation (executive and director compensation), 
Progressive (progressive practices on board appointments and board review, among other 
things), Ownership (ownership by directors), and Education (director education).  Id. at 8.  
Testing each governance category separately, they find that all categories except State and 
Education have a positive and significant association with firm value.  Id. at 18-19. 
 In addition to these U.S. indices, Bernie Black, Hasung Jang, and Woochan Kim create a 
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At the same time, empirical corporate governance scholars have 
acknowledged the difficulty of identifying causal mechanisms in corporate 
governance.  Corporate governance features are likely to be simultaneously 
determined with other firm characteristics – capital structure, ownership 
structure, and corporate performance, for example.33  Simultaneity therefore 
poses a serious concern and an important qualifier for drawing any conclusions 
from empirical analysis.34  We do not attempt to resolve these potential biases 
in the existing empirical corporate governance literature.  Instead, we take 
these approaches as given.  We rely on several existing measures of corporate 
governance – GIM’s G-index, BCF’s E-index, and individual components of 
the E-index – as alternative controls and interaction terms in our models below. 
B. The Possibility of Bank Governance 
Implicit in the empirical corporate governance scholarship is the assumption 
that legal rules and contracts structuring relations among firm managers and 
shareholders supply the primary governance mechanisms affecting managerial 
agency costs and firm performance.  The corporate finance literature, on the 
other hand, has focused primarily on financial intermediation and the benefits 
of cross-monitoring among investors, and has developed largely independently 
from the corporate governance literature.35  Relying in part on this cross-
monitoring literature, legal scholars have developed theories of bank 
governance, suggesting that banks may play an important governance role as 
the firm approaches distress.  These new theories focus primarily on the 
distress context and banks’ influence once the firm has defaulted on its debt 
obligation.  By contrast, we contend that bank monitoring has broader 
influence, affecting firm performance generally.  We first introduce the 
handful of studies suggesting the possibility of bank governance.  We then 
briefly survey the finance literature on bank monitoring. 
 
corporate governance index for Korean companies, again showing a strong association 
between corporate governance and firm value.  Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, & Woochan 
Kim, Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values?: Evidence from Korea, 
22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 368 (2006). 
33 See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 31, at 9. 
34 Simultaneity is more fully discussed in Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 31, at 23.  Bhagat 
and Bolton highlight the endogeneity issues affecting earlier studies.  Unlike these earlier 
studies, they rely on a system of four simultaneous equations to address endogeneity.  See 
id. at 11.  Bhagat and Bolton propose a new governance measure – the dollar value of stock 
ownership of the median director – as an alternative to the unweighted G- and E-indexes.  
Id. 
35 One exception is Klock, et al., supra note 9, at 693 (considering the relationship 
between debt financing and corporate governance). 
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1.  Bank Governance 
George Triantis and Ron Daniels were among the first to suggest that bank 
monitoring might benefit a firm’s claimants generally and a firm’s 
shareholders in particular.36  In their seminal 1995 article, they proposed an 
interactive theory of corporate governance, arguing that stakeholders’ exit 
decisions provide valuable information to one another, thereby enhancing their 
collective ability to discipline management.37  The bank is the central monitor 
under this theory: its specialized monitoring abilities make it the low-cost 
monitor.38  Because the borrower and creditors as a group care about 
minimizing total monitoring costs, the borrower willingly grants covenant 
protections to the bank that it may not grant other creditors.  The bank’s 
contract rights and ongoing monitoring enable it both to deter managerial slack 
and to detect it early.  Upon detection, the bank may either exit or intervene, 
even to the point of having management replaced.39  In either case, the bank’s 
action signals other stakeholders, who may also act to protect their interests.  
While classic finance theory focuses on the conflicts between debt holders and 
equity holders,40 especially as the firm nears distress, the bank lender may have 
good reason to work toward the firm’s recovery as a going concern.  The 
prospect of repeat business with the firm may serve to align the bank’s 
interests with those of equity holders as to investment policy and the firm’s 
recovery.41 
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have recently renewed the focus on 
creditor monitoring and corporate governance, describing creditor control as 
the “missing lever” in the corporate governance literature.42  They highlight the 
underappreciated role that banks and bank loan covenants play in corporate 
governance when a firm defaults.  The detailed reporting obligations and 
contract constraints imposed by the loan agreement, as well as the bank’s 
ability to control the borrower’s cash, enable the bank literally to control the 
firm.43  Once the firm defaults, the bank’s ability to discipline management is 
much greater than with traditional governance mechanisms.44  Banks routinely 
 
36 Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1074. 
37 Id. at 1080. 
38 Id. at 1083 (emphasizing that the bank enjoys better information than other creditors, 
and its business model generates monitoring economies not available to other creditors).   
39 Id. at 1084. 
40 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 305. 
41 Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1100-01. 
42 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211. 
43 See id. at 1227-29 (illustrating the degree to which banks can exert control over a firm 
by managing its cash flow). 
44 Compare, for example, bank monitoring with monitoring by shareholders – the firm’s 
traditional “owners.”  Banks enjoy far better information about the firm, and exercise far 
more oversight and control over the firm’s affairs, than do shareholders.  See id. at 1217.  
The corporate charter is a short document; the loan agreement can easily exceed one 
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demand management changes when a borrower firm defaults,45 something 
shareholders simply cannot do.  Similarly, the market for corporate control has 
only a weak disciplining effect on management compared to bank discipline.  
Firms may erect takeover defenses to deter hostile takeovers, but once they 
take on private debt, they have little defense against creditor control.46 
Like Triantis and Daniels, Baird and Rasmussen resist the finance canon on 
the agency costs of debt, which focuses on the conflicts among different 
investor classes that preclude efficient investment when the firm is in 
distress.47  Baird and Rasmussen describe the incentives of the senior lender – 
typically the bank – to pursue even risky projects to maximize firm value.48  If 
a sale is in the offing, as is common, the senior lender will not oppose efficient 
but risky investments, since it will be interested in increasing the firm’s value 
and sale price.49  Even with no possibility of a sale, the senior lender may 
endorse risky investments.  The senior lender’s claim is often converted to 
equity in a Chapter Eleven reorganization, so it has the same incentives as the 
classic residual owner.50 
 
hundred pages.  See id.  
45 Id. at 1233-34; Sadi Ozelge, The Role of Banks and Private Lenders in Forced CEO 
Turnovers 1 (Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1031814 (finding that for an underperforming firm, an average level of bank debt 
implies a twenty-five to forty-six percent increase in the probability of forced CEO turnover, 
and if the underperforming firm violates a loan covenant, the increased probability of forced 
CEO turnover jumps to sixty-seven to ninety-percent). 
46 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1244.  Simply paying off the loan is typically not 
a ready option: 
In theory, a business can rid itself of a creditor who presses too hard by repaying the 
loan, but a business that encounters difficulty with a private creditor is likely to have 
trouble replacing it with another.  Any new lender has to worry about the private 
information held by the existing lender.  The existing lender may want to withdraw for 
reasons that are not yet plain to outsiders.  Any new lender is in any event bound to 
insist upon its own control rights to protect itself. 
Id. 
47 See id. at 1212-13.  For the finance canon on agency costs of debt, see generally 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12. 
48 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1246.  Under the traditional finance canon, 
the senior lender of the distressed firm will typically resist risky projects, and even efficient 
ones, because it will bear a disproportionate share of any losses without enjoying a 
commensurate share of the gains.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 334. 
49 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1246. 
50 See id. at 1246-47.  As other evidence of coincident interests across different investor 
classes, Baird & Rasmussen note the recent popularity of “silent” second lien loans, where a 
junior lender takes a second lien in the senior lender’s collateral, but agrees to follow the 
senior’s lead on major issues in the bankruptcy case, including DIP financing, asset sales, 
and voting on the plan of reorganization.  These arrangements evidence sophisticated 
investors’ recognition of shared interests across investor classes.  See id. 
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Aside from these thoughtful discussions, creditor governance has largely 
been ignored in the legal and finance literature.  As earlier noted, this nascent 
literature took early cues from corporate finance scholars, who beginning in 
the 1980s pioneered the research indirectly suggesting the possibility of bank 
governance.  The next Section briefly reviews this finance literature. 
2.  The Supporting Finance Literature 
The theoretical case for banks’ special monitoring ability has been modeled 
extensively.51  Empirical testing of this proposition has generally taken the 
form of event studies showing positive abnormal stock returns triggered by 
firms’ bank loan announcements.52  These studies confirm that banks’ 
extensions of credit generally benefit stockholders of the borrower firm.53 
Two theoretical accounts have been offered to explain this effect.  The 
positive stock price reaction may reflect the value of future bank monitoring 
over the life of the loan.  Alternatively, the bank’s initial lending decision may 
itself create a positive market reaction by resolving information asymmetry for 
the market.  The bank’s decision to lend in effect acts as a signal for good 
firms.  The bank obtains private information about the firm during its pre-loan 
diligence process.  Its lending decision may therefore convey positive private 
information concerning the firm’s creditworthiness or the value of its 
projects.54  These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and studies tend to 
suggest that both information asymmetry and monitoring theories may help 
 
51 See Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kracaw, Information Production, Market 
Signaling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. FIN. 863 (1980); Douglas W. 
Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393 
(1984); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29 (1985); 
Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Information Reliability and a Theory of 
Financial Intermediation, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 415 (1984).  
52 See supra note 10. 
53 See Billet et al., supra note 10, at 700.  Several studies suggest that non-bank private 
debt may also bring bank-like benefits to equity holders.  These studies show a positive 
stock price reaction to announcements of non-bank private debt placements, with no 
statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus non-bank private debt.  
See Billet, et al., supra note 10, at 700 (finding no significant difference between abnormal 
returns for bank versus nonbank loans); Dianna C. Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, 
Monitoring by Financial Intermediaries: Banks versus Nonbanks, 8 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 
193, 200-01 (1994) (finding that borrowing firms experience positive abnormal returns upon 
announcing conclusions of loan agreements with nonbank lenders).  Our data identify only 
bank debt, however.  Other forms of private debt – loans made by non-bank entities like 
insurance companies and commercial finance companies, for example – are not included. 
54 See James, supra note 10, at 225-27 (finding a positive stock price response to the 
announcement of new bank credit agreements); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, 
Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 58-59 
(1986). 
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explain the market’s positive reaction.  Because our focus is on monitoring, we 
discuss empirical support for the monitoring theory below.55 
An early study of positive stock price reactions to bank loan announcements 
distinguishes bank loans by stated purpose.56  Comparing loans for debt 
refinance with capital expenditure loans, the study finds no significant 
difference in stock price response.57  Abnormal stock returns from new loan 
announcements therefore cannot be explained solely by an information 
asymmetry theory,58 since debt refinance loans convey no private information 
about the firm’s growth prospects.  Though the study’s author draws no 
definitive conclusion as to other causal theories,59 bank monitoring offers a 
plausible explanation.60 
Another study distinguishes between new bank loans and loan renewals.61  It 
finds excess stock returns almost exclusively around the announcement of loan 
renewals, but not new loans.
62
  The authors conclude that the value to 
shareholders comes not from the initial screening of prospective borrowers, but 
from private information the bank gleans during the course of its relationship 
 
55 As for information asymmetry, several studies support this notion that an extension of 
bank credit conveys positive private information about the firm.  See Best & Zhang, supra 
note 10, at 1520-22.  Using financial analysts’ percentage earnings forecast errors as a proxy 
for information asymmetry, one study shows that firms with high forecast errors enjoy 
significant positive stock price reactions to bank loan announcements, while firms with low 
forecast errors do not.  Id. at 1517.  Along similar lines, another study investigates public 
companies’ marginal financing decisions, confirming the positive abnormal stock returns 
that accompany bank loan announcements, which are both statistically significant and also 
significantly different from the negative abnormal returns accompanying announcements of 
public issues of common stock and straight debt.  See Charles J. Hadlock & Christopher M. 
James, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, 57 J. FIN. 1383, 1386 (2002).  This study also 
finds that firms choosing bank debt have higher stock return volatility and higher analyst 
forecast errors than firms issuing public securities, which is consistent with the notion that 
information asymmetry and adverse selection costs drive firms to choose bank debt.  Id. at 
1385.   
56 James, supra note 10, at 228. 
57 Id.  James finds the same result when capital expenditure loans are combined with 
general purpose corporate loans.  Id. at 228-29. 
58 Id. at 229. 
59 The author leaves this question for future research.  Id. at 234. 
60 As interesting, the study finds a statistically significant negative stock price reaction 
for announcements of private and straight public debt offerings used to refinance bank 
loans.  Id.  One plausible explanation for the market’s negative reaction – consistent with 
our monitoring story – is that these transactions harm shareholders by eliminating the bank 
monitor. 
61 Scott L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending 
Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 
99 (1989). 
62
Id. at 120. 
  




  This result is consistent with a monitoring theory.  Banks 
provide a credible signal of firm value only as a result of continuing 
information gathering with respect to a borrower firm.64 
In addition to these event studies, another study investigates the monitoring 
benefits of private debt, including bank debt.65  Examining various potential 
determinants of a firm’s mix of public and private debt, the study finds that 
firms with greater growth prospects – and therefore greater debt-related moral 
hazard problems66 – rely more heavily on private debt than on public debt.  
The authors attribute this result to the monitoring advantages of private debt.67  
The stricter monitoring and more restrictive covenants that accompany private 
debt help mitigate the costs associated with shareholder-creditor conflict.68 
These studies are consistent with our monitoring hypothesis.69  We develop 
our hypothesis in Part II. 
 
63
Id. at 113. 
64 Id.  One drawback here is that subsequent research has not supported Lummer and 
McConnell’s claimed distinction between new loans and renewals.  Controlling for 
differences in other borrower and lender characteristics, such as precision of analyst 
earnings forecasts and lender credit quality, subsequent studies find no statistically 
significant difference in stock price reaction to announcements of new loans versus 
renewals.  See Best & Zhang, supra note 10, at 1512-13; Billett et al., supra note 10, at 716. 
65 Sudha Krishnaswami, Paul A. Spindt & Venkat Subramaniam, Information 
Asymmetry, Monitoring, and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 
407, 414 (1999) (defining private debt as including bank loans, finance company loans, and 
loans from other financial institutions). 
66 Greater growth prospects beget higher moral hazard because of the greater potential 
for asset substitution and underinvestment.  Id. at 411 (commenting that “contracting costs 
due to underinvestment and asset substitution are higher for firms with more growth options 
because [of] the conflict between shareholders and bondholders”). 
67 Id. at 432. 
68 Id.  The study also confirms that firms with greater potential information asymmetries 
rely more on private debt than other firms.  Id. at 428. 
69 Other studies confirm the value of bank monitoring to claimants other than 
shareholders.  One study finds evidence of the value of bank monitoring to bondholders’ 
benefit.  See Datta, et al., supra note 9, at 448.  In this study, the presence of a pre-existing 
bank loan reduced at-issue yield spreads for borrower firms’ first public debt offerings by an 
average of sixty-eight basis points, which was both statistically and economically 
significant.  Id. at 437.  As the authors note, this likely reflects the value of bank monitoring, 
which reduces moral hazard in a way that bondholders alone cannot.  Id. at 436.  It would be 
difficult to explain the reduced at-issue yield spreads in terms of bank screening and reduced 
information asymmetry: at the time of the bond issue, the already-existing bank loan offers 
no new information to the market.  Moreover, the length of the bank/firm relationship is also 
statistically significant and negatively related to at-issue yield spreads, which is again 
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis.  See id. at 437.  Though the authors offer a 
reputation story to explain this result, id. at 449, a lengthy bank/firm relationship may also 
signal the bank’s familiarity with the borrower’s business, thereby improving the bank’s 
ability to monitor. 
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II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the burgeoning empirical corporate governance literature, to date no 
one has attempted to measure the effects of bank monitoring on firm value.  No 
study has attempted to investigate the interaction of bank monitoring with 
corporate governance.  We hypothesize that bank monitoring may enhance 
firm value.  Over a wide range of situations, the interests of lenders and equity 
holders may converge in reducing managerial agency costs.  Because creditors 
and equity holders share a common interest in agency cost reduction, we 
hypothesize that bank monitoring enhances firm value.  In this Part, we first 
explain our affirmative hypotheses.  We then discuss some potential theoretical 
limitations. 
A.  Our Hypotheses 
1.  Bank Monitoring: The Mechanics 
How does bank monitoring operate to control agency costs?  The standard 
credit agreement imposes numerous specific restrictions and obligations on the 
borrower firm regarding operational matters and financial condition.70  In 
addition, the bank also demands a regular flow of information from the 
borrower concerning its financial and operating performance.  As detailed 
below, the bank typically imposes numerous periodic and special reporting 
requirements on the borrower. 
As far as operational constraints, negative covenants prohibit the firm from 
engaging in certain transactions without the bank’s consent.  For example, the 
firm’s latitude to incur new debt, make investments or distributions, engage in 
transactions with affiliates, sell substantial assets, give liens on its assets, 
merge, or change the nature of its business, may all be explicitly restricted in 
the loan agreement.  Use of loan proceeds is restricted.  In addition to 
operational restrictions, financial covenants generally require the firm to 
maintain a healthy financial condition.  It must, for example, preserve certain 
levels of net worth, tangible assets, total capital relative to debt, or cash flow 
relative to debt service obligations.71  Myriad technical default provisions in 
the contract enable the bank to tighten the reins if the firm falters. 
 
 Another study examines loan and bond defaults, comparing trading price reactions around 
the default date and finding a smaller price reaction for loans than bonds, which suggests 
that more precise information is embedded in loan prices because of banks’ superior 
ongoing monitoring.  Edward Altman, Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Bank Debt 
Versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices 30 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639081. 
70 See, e.g., Staples Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 20, 2004) (describing 
2004 Revolving Credit Agreement with Bank of America); Stride Rite Corp., Current 
Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Sept. 22, 2005) (describing revolving credit agreement with Bank 
of America). 
71 Bond indentures contain similar provisions.  See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. U.S. 
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In addition to operational constraints and financial covenants, the bank 
keeps tabs on the borrower by requiring it to produce a steady stream of 
information to the bank in the form of periodic financial and operating reports.  
This information is far more timely and detailed than any regular public 
disclosure the borrower firm may be required to make.  The bank also typically 
enjoys direct access to firm management to address any concerns it might 
have.  Banks therefore enjoy far better information about a firm than individual 
or even institutional investors.  With its periodic reports, the firm must also 
certify its continuing compliance with each specific condition and restriction 
contained in the credit agreement.  For example, in addition to producing 
quarterly financial statements, the firm may be required specifically to certify 
its net worth, tangible assets, cash flow, or other accounting benchmarks in 
order to confirm its compliance with individual financial covenants.  Besides 
these regular reports, the borrower obligates itself to provide notice to the bank 
of the occurrence of any of a number of unfortunate incidents that might 
adversely affect the borrower’s creditworthiness – material litigation, a default 
or potential default on the loan, or receipt of a government notice of a material 
regulatory violation, for example. 
In addition to contractual constraints and ongoing reporting, the bank often 
has a representative on the borrower’s board of directors,72 which offers one 
more avenue for active monitoring.  Banks also enjoy institutional features that 
facilitate monitoring.  They typically offer cash management services to their 
borrowers, who are often required to maintain their deposit accounts with their 
bank lender.  This arrangement enables a bank to closely follow its borrower’s 
aggregation and use of cash in real time, giving the bank a clear window on the 
borrower’s business activity.  Bank lending practices also facilitate monitoring.  
Bank lending is ordinarily only short-term or medium-term,73 which means 
borrowers must periodically renew their bank lending arrangements.  This 
gives the bank fresh opportunities to re-examine its borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, and also gives borrower managers incentive to maintain 
creditworthiness.  Banks often also specialize in lending to particular industries 
or industry segments.  Industry expertise facilitates monitoring and enables 
bankers to more precisely evaluate the ongoing credit risk of individual 
borrower firms. 
 
Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 943 (Del. Ch. 2004).  The court’s 
detailed technical discussion of note indenture provisions in that case illustrates the 
thoroughness and complexity of creditor protections in standard credit arrangements.  See 
id. at 943-47. 
72 See Randall S. Krozner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts 
of Interest, and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 416 (2001) (explaining that one-third 
of large U.S. firms have a banker on the board of directors). 
73 Banks’ predominant liabilities are short-term deposits, so to match the timing of their 
assets and liabilities, banks tend to avoid long-term loans. 
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2.  The Pervasive Effects of Bank Monitoring 
Contrary to the existing bank governance literature, we believe banks’ 
elaborate monitoring arrangements affect managerial behavior and firm value 
even outside the narrow distress context.74  Financial covenants in public 
company credit agreements are pervasive,75 and managers have strong 
incentive to avoid breaching their covenant obligations, lest their managerial 
discretion be curtailed by bank intervention.76  In addition to this threat, credit 
agreements quite often contain positive performance incentives for managers, 
such as variable pricing based on specified performance measures.77  The 
borrower’s interest rate may rise or fall, for example, based on the firm’s ratio 
of debt-to-cash flow.78  Moreover, covenant violations are not uncommon.79  
Violations do trigger bank intervention, but they rarely lead to default or loan 
acceleration.80  Given this environment, it makes sense that banks’ influence 
on firm governance may be steady rather than episodic, felt even outside the 
distress context. 
3.  Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flow has been identified as an especially pernicious temptation for 
managers, who may “use it to bankroll forms of managerial slack.”81  Free cash 
 
 
74  See Frederick Tung, Private Debt and Corporate Governance 44-45 (Sept. 14, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the recent empirical finance 
literature demonstrating the governance effects of private debt). 
75 See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An 
Empirical Investigation 7 (Aug. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=962131 (finding that ninety-seven percent of public company credit 
agreements in the 1996-2005 sample period had at least one financial covenant). 
76 See id. at 14 (commenting upon managers’ singular desire to maintain control of their 
companies). 
77 See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Contingency and Renegotiation of Financial 
Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements 8 (July 31, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017629 (finding that over seventy-two 
percent of private credit agreements specify performance pricing). 
78 Id. 
79 See Roberts & Sufi, supra note 75, at 42 tbl.2 (indicating that more than one quarter of 
public companies in the 1996-2005 sample period violated a financial covenant, with the 
fraction increasing to nearly one-third for firms with an average leverage ratio of at least 
five percent). 
80 V. Gopalakrishnan & Mohinder Parkash, Borrower and Lender Perceptions of 
Accounting Information in Corporate Lending Agreements, in 9 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 13, 
25 (1995). 
81 Triantis & Daniels, supra note 7, at 1078; see also Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of 
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).  
We use a standard measure of free cash flow: operating income minus interest expense, 
taxes, preferred and common dividends, scaled by the book value of the firm’s assets.  See 
infra Part III.D.2. 
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flow may increase the agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
because managers may be tempted to spend free cash for their own benefit – 
on perks or empire building, for example – rather than distribute it to 
shareholders.82  Managers may overinvest – invest inefficiently83 – in building 
empires in order to increase their compensation and power.  An increase in 
firm size places more resources under managers’ control, thereby enhancing 
their power and prestige.84  Similarly, increased firm size typically results in 
sales growth, which is positively correlated with increases in manager 
compensation.85 
We expect that, ceteris paribas, firms with high free cash flow will benefit 
most from bank monitoring because of their higher potential for agency 
conflicts.  Bank loan arrangements address this free cash flow problem in 
several ways.  First, mandatory regular interest and principal payments on the 
loan reduce the amount of free cash.86  Second, bank loans often contain a 
“sweep” covenant, which requires the borrower to pay down some portion of 
its loan once it has engaged in an asset sale or financing transaction that 
generates a large accumulation of cash,87 or even if it has simply accumulated 
“excess” cash.88  Third, as described above, the lender typically requires the 
borrower firm to maintain its deposit accounts with the lender.  This enables 
the lender to monitor the firm’s cash levels and uses of cash.89  Finally, the 
bank may take security interests in the firm’s assets, which further constrains 
managers’ access to free cash.  Because the security arrangement ordinarily 
prohibits sale or further hypothecation of the underlying collateral, managers’ 
disposal of those assets to generate cash is not an option.90 
Overall, the web of reporting requirements, covenant obligations and other 
restrictions, along with explicit bank oversight, serve to constrain 
overinvestment and otherwise control managerial slack.  This disciplining 
 
82 See Jensen, supra note 81, at 323. 
83 Managers overinvest when, finding themselves with cash available after having 
pursued all available efficient investment opportunities, they continue to invest – in negative 
net present value projects – because they can.  See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in 
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627-28 (1989). 
84 Id. at 627. 
85 Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An 
Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 40 (1985). 
86 See Jensen, supra note 81, at 324. 
87 See Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate 
Debt Covenants 11 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=466240. 
88 This latter constraint is typically expressed as a requirement that some percentage of 
the borrower’s free cash above a specified threshold be applied to reduce the loan balance. 
89 See supra Part II.A.1. 
90 See George G. Triantis, A Free Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor 
Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2159-61 (1994). 
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effect of bank debt benefits shareholders as well as the bank.  We do not 
suggest that lender and shareholder interests always coincide.91  Shareholders 
of course suffer the first pain from managerial slack, since they hold the 
residual claim on the firm.  At the margin, therefore, the bank may worry less 
than the firm’s equity holders about managers’ misuse of free cash.92  
However, because inefficient investment reduces firm value, it harms lenders 
as well as equity investors.  The popularity of capital expenditure covenants 
and excess cash flow covenants attests to this lender concern.93 
4. Management Entrenchment 
With regard to management entrenchment, as with free cash flow, we expect 
bank monitoring to be most beneficial when agency costs are high – i.e., when 
managers are more entrenched.  Entrenchment insulates managers from 
discipline by shareholders and by the market for corporate control, thereby 
encouraging slack.  We use GIM’s G-index, BCF’s E-index, and individual 
components of the E-index as controls and interaction variables to test the 
effects of bank monitoring in the presence of entrenchment. 
B. Potential Theoretical Limitations 
1.  Moral Hazard or Adverse Selection?: Monitoring Versus Information 
Asymmetry 
Because we use a market-based metric for firm value as our dependent 
variable – industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q – a preliminary issue arises in trying to 
interpret observed increases in Tobin’s Q associated with the presence of bank 
loans.  As noted earlier, both the theoretical and empirical finance literature 
identify two main explanations for the positive stock market reaction to bank 
loan announcements.94  First, bank loan announcements may resolve 
information asymmetries affecting stock markets.  A bank loan signals the 
market that the borrower is creditworthy or has good projects.  Second, 
positive stock market reactions may also reflect the value to the firm of bank 
monitoring.  While banks monitor to reduce moral hazard, the firm’s 
 
91 Jensen and Meckling’s classic work explains managers’ incentives and means to 
transfer wealth opportunistically from creditors to shareholders.  See generally Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 12. 
92 Moreover, the bank may object more strenuously to asset substitution, even through 
positive net present value projects, than overinvestment through low-risk projects. 
93 See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, The Information Content of Bank Loan 
Covenants 9 (Aug. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 959393; Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control 
Rights and Firm Investment Policy 2 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 928688 (finding that forty percent of firms faced a capital 
expenditure restriction during a 1996-2005 sample period). 
94 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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shareholders may also benefit from the bank’s ability to deter self-interested 
overinvestment by the firm’s managers. 
Earlier, we reviewed in some detail the extant literature on the value of bank 
monitoring, noting the importance of bank monitoring to curb moral hazard, as 
well as the possible selection effects at work.95  We are mindful of these 
competing explanations in designing our study.  Because an increase in 
Tobin’s Q associated with a bank loan is consistent with either explanation, we 
look at subsamples of firm-years in an attempt to isolate the monitoring 
effect.96  We also examine subsamples of loans based on their stated purposes, 
hypothesizing that certain types of loans carry little or no benefit to equity 
markets in terms of resolving information asymmetry. 
2. Risk Reduction and Banks’ Reduced Incentives to Monitor 
Banks and other financial claimants have increasingly more and finer 
opportunities to transfer risk to third parties.  Loan syndication, active 
secondary loan markets, and the ready availability of credit derivatives97 
enable banks and other financial institutions to lay off risk and rebalance their 
portfolios in response to changed circumstances.  A bank’s reduced exposure 
to a particular borrower correspondingly reduces the bank’s incentive to 
monitor that borrower carefully.98 
While use of these risk spreading devices has become more and more 
common among banks and other private lenders,99 there remain good reasons 
to expect that banks – especially lead banks in syndicated loans – will continue 
to monitor their borrowers.  Lead banks have reputational interests at stake.  
Other less informed syndicate members depend on the lead bank for careful 
screening and monitoring of borrowers.  A lead bank that acts opportunistically 
toward its syndicate members – by syndicating poor quality loans, for instance 
– could incur reputational penalties with syndicate members, risking future 
 
95 See supra Part I.B.2. 
96 See infra p. 1023 tbl.3. 
97 The most popular credit derivative for bank lenders is the credit default swap.  It 
effectively offers the lender default insurance on specific borrowers.  As with conventional 
insurance, the insured (here, the lender) pays a premium to the issuer of the swap agreement, 
which obligates the issuer to repay the insured debt (or some portion) to the insured should 
the borrower default.  See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Peril of 
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021-22 (2007). 
98 See id. at 1032-34. 
99 See, e.g., Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 404, 404 (2000) (describing the growing prevalence of syndicated loans); 
Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennachi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable 
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391 (1995) (describing the dramatic rise in loan sales 
that occurred in the 1980s); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 97, at 1020 (describing the 
increased prevalence of credit derivatives). 
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business.100  Empirical evidence shows, in fact, that lead banks are faithful 
certifiers of credit quality to their bank syndicates.  While they could exploit 
private information about borrowers by syndicating or selling only loans of 
lower ex ante credit quality, existing studies show just the opposite.  Loans of 
higher ex ante credit quality are more likely to be syndicated in larger 
proportions by lead banks.101  Lead banks’ success in syndicating larger 
percentages of their loans is also positively associated with reputational 
measures.102 
More generally, empirical evidence suggests that bank monitoring continues 
to have value in the presence of bank debt trading.  Amar Gande and Anthony 
Saunders find that bank loan announcements continue to be associated with 
positive stock price reactions even when the borrower’s loans trade on the 
secondary market.103  This result holds even for distressed firms, for which 
reduced incentives for bank monitoring would ex ante be expected to have the 
most adverse effects.104  Additionally, the inception of trading in the borrower 
firm’s bank debt elicits a positive stock price reaction, suggesting that bank 
monitoring and the secondary market offer complementary sources of 
information about borrower firms.105 
Even with devices available to reduce risk, banks’ profit making generally 
depends on their taking positions in their borrower firms.  A bank is not merely 
a loan broker.  It gets paid to take risk.  Though the bank may have new tools 
available to enable it to lend at lower risk, it still has incentive to monitor given 
its exposure and the importance of its reputational capital.106  Moreover, 
diversification does not eliminate lending risk entirely.  Loan purchasers and 
sellers of credit derivatives will have some stake in the continuing monitoring 
 
100 See Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Loan Syndicate Structure: 
Evidence from Ex Post Risk 25 (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083707 (suggesting that “the lead bank’s reputation can serve as 
an effective mechanism to assuage the incentive conflicts associated with loan 
syndications”). 
101 See Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 99, at 424; cf. Panyagometh & Roberts, supra 
note 100, at 24 (finding that lead banks syndicate greater proportions of loans to ex post 
higher quality borrowers as measured by bond ratings).  Similarly, higher quality loans ex 
ante are more likely to be sold in secondary markets.  Gorton & Pennachi, supra note 99, at 
409-410. 
102 Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 99, at 407. 
103 See Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a 
Secondary Market for Loans? 3 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=873353. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 22. 
106 See Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and 
the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 109 (2004) 
(discussing reputational benefits for loan sellers and arrangers). 
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of borrowers, the efficacy of which will no doubt affect the pricing in these 
risk spreading transactions. 
III. BANK MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE 
To explore the relationship between bank monitoring and firm value, we 
estimate a series of multivariate regressions that measure how Tobin’s Q is 
related to the presence of bank loans.  We describe our methodology before 
presenting our results. 
A.  Methodology 
1. The Model’s Technical Structure 
Our model is: 
 
(1)  
 TobinsQit  =   + 1LOANit + 2GINDEXit +  




TobinsQ   Our dependent variable, which is each firm’s industry- 
 adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
 
LOAN  This indicates whether a given firm had a bank loan for all 
 twelve calendar months of year t. 
 
GINDEX G-index, GIM’s measure of managerial entrenchment. 
 
FINANCIAL Includes six standard financial controls: 
  i.   Assets of the firm; 
  ii.  Age of the firm in months; 
  iii. Return on assets; 
  iv. Capital expenditures on assets; 
  v.  Research and development expenditures; and 
  vi. Leverage. 
 
f and y Firm and year dummy variables. 
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2.  Our Data 
Our universe of companies comes from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) database,107 which has published volumes detailing firms’ 
corporate governance provisions since 1990.108  IRRC’s coverage includes all 
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P), all firms named in annual lists of 
the largest corporations by Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week, and additional 
firms the IRRC has considered important.109  In any publication year, the 
universe of IRRC firms covers over ninety percent of total U.S. stock market 
capitalization.110  Following GIM and BCF, we include all IRRC firms in our 
database through 2004, except for those with dual-class common stock.  
Because IRRC volumes are not published every year, we follow the 
convention adopted by GIM in treating firms’ governance provisions as 
unchanged for the period from the last published volume to the next published 
volume.111 
We take firm financial information from Compustat.
112
  Company stock data 
comes from CRSP monthly files.113  For loan information, we rely on the 
DealScan database from the Loan Pricing Corporation, a comprehensive 
commercial loan database covering large- and middle-market commercial 
loans.114  DealScan contains detailed terms and conditions for over 155,000 
loan and bond transactions dating back to 1988.115 
3.  Details of the Model 
Equation (1) measures the relationship between industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 
and the presence of a bank loan, while controlling for other factors that also 
affect firm value.  Our estimation of this equation will disaggregate the 
influence of each included factor, allowing us to distinguish the influence of 
bank loans from other factors that might also affect firm value.  As noted 
above, we use Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm value.116  Tobin’s Q is the 
 
107 IRRC is a proxy advisory service used primarily by institutional investors.  Gompers 
et al., supra note 2, at 113. 
108 Id. at 110. 
109 Id. at 111. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 110-19. 
 
112
 Compustat is an extensive database of securities information created and maintained 
by Standard & Poors.  Standard & Poors’ Compustat Website, 
http://www.compustatresources.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
113 CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices which is part of the University of 
Chicago’s Graduate School of Business.  About CRSP, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/about 
/history.html (last visited May 24, 2008). 
114 See DealScan, http://www.loanpricing.com/products_services/dealscan.htm (last 
visited May 5, 2008). 
115 Id. 
116 See supra Part III.A.1.  In our definition of Tobin’s Q, we follow Bebchuk et al., 
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ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market 
value of assets is equal to the book value of assets, plus the market value of 
common stock, minus the sum of book value of common stock and balance 
sheet deferred taxes.  The dependent variable in our estimations is industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q – each firm’s Q minus the median Q in the firm’s industry 
in the observation year.  We define each firm’s industry by the firm’s two-digit 
primary SIC code. 
Our proxy for bank monitoring is a loan indicator variable, which is set to 
one for each year that a given firm had a bank loan for all twelve calendar 
months.  We include standard financial controls that previous research has 
identified as related to Tobin’s Q.117  We also include year dummies and firm 
dummies in the fixed effects regressions. 
In most specifications, we rely on GIM’s G-index as a measure of 
managerial entrenchment.  As an alternative in some specifications, we include 
BCF’s E-index or its components as entrenchment measures.  We use these as 
either controls or as interaction variables.  We also include a measure of free 
cash flow in some estimations.  As noted earlier, the tendency of managers to 
overinvest or misuse discretionary funds presents a serious agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders.118  Michael Jensen asserts that free cash 
flow is the best measure of these discretionary funds and thus the best proxy 
for agency conflicts.119  Our measure of free cash flow is calculated as 
operating income minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividend, and 
common dividends,120 scaled by the book value of the firm’s assets.121 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of variables included in the 
estimations.  We present the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of 
firms.  We also divide our sample into two subsamples – firms that have had a 
bank loan at some point during our sample period and firms that have not – and 
present descriptive statistics for these subsamples as well. 
 
 
What Matters, supra note 29, at 19, Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 126, and Steven N. 
Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures 
of Financing Constraints?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 169, 177 (1997). 
117 Following GIM, we include the assets of the firm and the age of the firm measured in 
months.  Gompers et al., supra note 2, at 126.  Following BCF, we include return on assets, 
capital expenditures on assets, research and development expenditures, and leverage.   
Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 19. 
118 See supra Part II.A.3. 
119 See Jensen, supra note 81, at 323-24. 
120 This cash flow computation is given by Compustat item #13 - #15 - (#16 - change in 
#35) - #19 - #21. 
121 This definition follows Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulson, Free Cash Flow and 
Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771, 777 (1989). 
  





























Tobin’s Q 22487 0.720 3.316  14470 0.546 2.199  8017 1.033 4.688 
Loan 
Indicator 28335 0.373 0.484  17472 0.605 0.489  10863 0.000 0.000 
G Index 17889 9.183 2.752  11923 9.349 2.757  5966 8.850 2.712 
E Index 17889 2.153 1.307  11923 2.191 1.299  5966 2.079 1.321 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 23337 0.092 0.183  15430 0.110 0.148  7907 0.057 0.234 
Assets 
(millions) 27886 6946.195 35947.88  17375 8214.022 43493.35  10511 4850.438 17158.770 
Firm Age 
(months) 28335 230.026 215.337  17472 254.798 224.330  10863 190.183 193.494 
ROA 27866 0.014 0.237  17365 0.037 0.134  10501 -0.024 0.341 
CAPEX/
Assets 25553 0.062 0.064  16648 0.061 0.061  8905 0.063 0.069 
Leverage 22860 0.436 0.249  14761 0.446 0.209  8099 0.417 0.308 
R&D per 
Sales 14328 0.490 7.903  9095 0.101 1.014  5233 1.166 12.981 
Poison 
Pill 
Indicator 17889 0.564 0.496  11923 0.586 0.493  5966 0.519 0.500 
The dataset includes information on Tobin’s Q, the loan indicator, and the G-index for 1117 
unique firms; 725 of these firms have a loan at some point during our sample period. 
 
In the remaining tables, we estimate equation (1) using a least-squares 
regression.  This is a standard difference-in-difference estimation that isolates 
the effect of bank loans on firm value by exploiting both differences across 
firms with and without loans and differences before and after firms obtain 
loans. 
B.  Bank Loans and Firm Value 
Table 2 reports the results of our primary estimation.122  We perform least-
squares regressions with firm fixed effects, which controls for unobserved firm 
 
122 In each table, the top number in each cell is the regression coefficient, which indicates 
the magnitude and direction of each variable’s relationship with Tobin’s Q.  A negative 
coefficient indicates that a variable has an inverse relationship with Tobin’s Q.  For 
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heterogeneity.  This enables us to focus on variation within each firm.  In both 
columns, the loan indicator variable has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with Tobin’s Q.123  This result indicates that within each firm, the 
presence of a bank loan is associated with higher Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
example, a negative coefficient on the loan variable would indicate that the presence of a 
bank loan is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q.  In contrast, a positive coefficient 
indicates that a variable is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q. 
 In addition, the table reports the t-statistic – a measure of statistical significance – for 
each coefficient.  In each cell, it is the bottom number.  Coefficients with t-statistics with 
absolute value equal to or greater than 1.645 are considered statistically significant at the 
10% level, meaning that there is 90% certainty that the coefficient is different from zero.  T-
statistics with absolute value equal to or greater than 1.96 indicate statistical significance at 
the more certain 5% level, and t-statistics with absolute value equal to or greater than 2.576 
indicate statistical significance at the most certain 1% level.  Empiricists typically require t -
statistics of at least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects another in the direction 
indicated by the coefficient.  In the table, coefficients are marked with “*”, “**”, and “***” 
to indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 The table also reports R-squared statistics.  R-squared statistics measure a regression’s 
“goodness of fit,” as opposed to t-statistics, which measure the reliability of each individual 
coefficient.  WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 34 (5th ed. 2003).  In other 
words, the R-squared measures how much of the overall variation in the dependent variable, 
here Tobin’s Q, is explained by the explanatory variables.  Id. at 33.  Thus, the R-squared of 
a regression will vary between 0 and 1.  Id.  When the R-squared value is 0, the explanatory 
variables explain none of the dependent variable’s variation.  Id.  An R-squared of 1 means 
that the explanatory variables explain all of the variation.  Id.  The closer the R-squared is to 
1, the better the regression explains the data.  Id. 
123 For each of the estimations in Tables 2 through 7, we also performed the estimations 
without control variables on the same sample of firms in the estimations with the full set of 
controls (i.e., so that the samples match).  We have no reason to think there is any selection 
bias between the firms that do and do not have data for the full set of controls.  Most of the 
results are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude when we run the without-
controls regressions on the smaller sample, but occasionally, a previously significant 
coefficient became insignificant.  For brevity’s sake, we do not report the results. 
  




Bank Loans and Firm Value 
Variable  A B 
Loan Indicator 0.085*** 0.151*** 
 2.79 2.73 
G-index -0.039*** -0.041** 
 -3.8 -2.05 
Assets  -.00001*** 
  -3.25 
Firm Age  -0.001 
  -1.25 
ROA  0.847*** 
  7.26 
CAPEX/Assets  2.579*** 
  4.62 
Leverage  0.926*** 
  7.37 
R&D per Sales  0.015*** 
   5.08 
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 13710 6711 
R-squared 0.628 0.622 
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects, with and without control variables.  
The dependent variable in all regressions is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is equal to the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus the 
sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes.  We compute the 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the median Tobin’s Q in the industry from each 
firm’s Tobin’s Q, where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC code.  The loan indicator is 
equal to 1 for all years that firms had bank loans for all twelve months.  The G-index ranges 
from 0 to 24 to indicate the entrenchment provisions of each firm.  ROA is net 
income/assets.  CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditures/assets.  R&D per Sales is research 
and development expenditures/total sales.  Leverage is total debt/assets.  Although not 
shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions.  T-statistics appear below 
the coefficient estimates.  Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
The size of the coefficients suggests the average real-world magnitude of a 
change in Tobin’s Q associated with changes in each of the explanatory 
variables.  For example, when including the full set of financial controls (the 
estimation reported in the second column), the coefficients suggest that, 
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averaged across all firms and years, the presence of a loan increases Tobin’s Q 
by 0.151, whereas a one-unit increase in the G-index decreases Tobin’s Q by 
0.041.  As a further example, for a firm without a loan and with Tobin’s Q of 
0.876, which is the average industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for all firm-years 
without a loan, the presence of a loan is expected to increase Q by 17%, to 
1.027. 
Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of the results in Table 2.  The 
average industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q during years when firms do not have a 
loan is 0.876.  Column B in Table 2 shows that the average Tobin’s Q is 0.151 
higher during years when firms do have loans.124 
 
Figure 1: 




124 Here, and in the regressions that follow, our findings likely understate the monitoring 
benefits of bank debt because we assume each bank loan and its associated monitoring 
continue for the entire term given in the loan contract.  Limitations in the data preclude us 
from identifying loans repaid before stated maturity or pinpointing when such early 
retirements occur.  Therefore, we unavoidably count some number of firm-year observations 
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C.  Exploring Simultaneity, Monitoring, and Alternative Theories 
While the results from Table 2 indicate a positive correlation between the 
presence of a bank loan and firm value, they do not prove our case that bank 
monitoring improves firm value.  First of all, bank loans might not necessarily 
cause firm value to increase.  Selection effects may suggest that causation runs 
in the other direction: firms with higher Tobin’s Q are more likely to get bank 
loans than firms with lower Tobin’s Q.125  Alternatively, some unobservable 
factor may be responsible for both firms’ obtaining bank loans and high 
Tobin’s Q, so that a positive relationship between firm value and bank loans 
could exist even if bank loans did not cause firm value to increase.  For 
example, a switch to better management personnel could both improve a firm’s 
creditworthiness and also cause an increase in Tobin’s Q.  These are 
simultaneity concerns – some other factor may be at work simultaneously with 
a bank loan that is responsible for our results.  Another concern is selection on 
unobservables: firms and banks select which firms will receive loans, so even 
if all firms with loans showed bank monitoring-induced increases in Tobin’s 
Q, we could not necessarily be sure that other firms that do not have loans 
would also benefit from having one.  While we control for observable 
differences across firms, it may be that firms with loans differ across some 
unobservable dimension from firms without loans, and that this difference 
renders only the former susceptible to the beneficial effects of bank 
monitoring. 
Finally, even if the presence of a bank loan causes an increase in firm value, 
bank monitoring may not be the only plausible explanation.  The bank’s 
willingness to lend to a given firm may simply signal positive private 
information to stock markets about the firm’s creditworthiness or the strength 
of its projects.  The bank’s identification of the firm as a worthy borrower may 
be what causes an increase in Tobin’s Q by resolving information asymmetry 
for the markets, independent of any subsequent monitoring by the bank. 
In the subsequent tables, we offer evidence discounting the possibility that 
simultaneity accounts for our observed increases in firm value in the presence 
of bank loans.  In addition, our results below support our claim that bank 
monitoring is at least partly responsible for observed increases in firm value. 
1.  Simultaneity 
As a first check on the direction of causation, we ran unreported pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, similar to the estimations in Table 
2 but without fixed effects.  Our results tend to suggest causation runs in the 
direction we think.  Both with and without financial controls, the loan indicator 
 
125 Krishnaswami, supra note 65, at 420 (finding a significant positive relation between a 
firm’s market-to-book ratio and the proportion of its debt that is private debt).  Their 
measure of market-to-book ratio may be highly correlated with Tobin’s Q, which would 
suggest that firms with bank loans may simply have higher adjusted Tobin’s Q even if bank 
monitoring had no effect. 
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variable has a statistically significant negative relationship with Tobin’s Q.  
This indicates that in a standard cross-sectional relationship, firms with loans 
have lower Tobin’s Q than firms without loans.  Therefore, it does not appear 
that firms start with high Tobin’s Q and then get bank loans. 
In Table 3 we explore this issue further.  We attempt to determine whether, 
as between firms with and without bank loans, systematic differences exist that 
may be responsible for the positive relationship between loans and firm value.  
If such a systematic difference exists – again, consider the improved 
management example – which explains both why certain firms get bank loans 
and why those firms have higher value, then our causal attribution would be 
spurious.  In that case, bank monitoring could not be said to cause the observed 
increases in firm value. 
We run regressions with firm fixed effects, restricting our sample to: 
(a) firms in our sample that have a loan at some point during our sample period 
(the “Loan Firms”) (Cols. A & B); (b) Loan Firms and only comparing the 
period before the loan with the period during the loan (Cols. C & D); and 
(c) Loan Firms and only comparing the period during the loan with the period 
after the loan’s retirement (Cols. E & F).  These three specifications test 
whether a selection effect is driving our results.  By limiting the analysis only 
to Loan Firms, we control for other fundamental differences between Loan 
Firms and other firms that may be causing a higher Tobin’s Q.  Moreover, if 
we are able to confirm that Tobin’s Q both increases when firms get loans and 
decreases when firms retire loans, we minimize the possibility that an 
unobserved factor is responsible both for firms obtaining loans and for 
increases in Tobin’s Q.  It is unlikely that the effect of this unobserved factor 
would suddenly appear when a loan was obtained – causing a timely increase 
in Tobin’s Q – and  then disappear when a loan was retired, causing a timely 
decrease. 
For all the estimations using the full set of controls (Cols. B, D, and F), the 
loan’s effect on Tobin’s Q is positive and significant, providing strong 
evidence of a positive relation between bank monitoring and Tobin’s Q.  It is 
therefore unlikely that simultaneity is responsible for the positive relationship 
between bank loans and firm value. 
  
2008] THE CASE OF BANK MONITORING 1023 
 
  
1024 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:991 
 
Notes on Table 3: This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the 
dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculation of industry-
adjusted Tobin's Q, along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2.  
Columns A and B report estimations where the sample includes only firms that have loans 
during our sample period.  Columns C and D report estimations on only the Loan Firms and 
only comparing the period before the loan with the period during the loan.  Columns E and 
F report estimations on only the Loan Firms and only comparing the loan period with the 
period following the loan’s retirement.  Columns G and H report estimations on all firms, 
but controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before firms get bank loans.  In Columns I and J, 
our sample includes only firm-years where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s 
only loan(s) are for working capital, debt repayment, or commercial paper backup purposes, 
which are generally unrelated to the financing of good projects.  The loan indicator is equal 
to 1 for only the years that a firm had such a bank loan.  Although not shown in the tables, 
year and firm dummies are included in all regressions.  T-statistics appear below the 
coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
 
Figure 2 graphically represents the before, during, and after results from 
Table 3 that include the full set of financial controls.  The average industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q for our sample firms in the period before they have a loan 
is 0.656.  Column D in Table 3 shows that the average Tobin’s Q goes up by 
0.1 when these firms obtain a loan, and Column F shows that the average 
Tobin’s Q decreases by 0.142 when these firms retire their loans. 
 
Figure 2: 
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As an additional test, we run firm fixed effects regressions for the entire 
sample of firms, also controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before each firm 
obtains a bank loan (Cols. G & H).126  This control variable will capture non-
loan factors that may have increased firm value before the loan period and that 
would therefore produce a spurious positive correlation between a bank loan 
and Tobin’s Q.  The loan’s effect remains positive and significant in 
estimations both with and without controls.  This provides further comfort that 
the positive association we find between bank loans and firm value is not 
driven by some non-loan factor. 
2.  Monitoring Versus Information Asymmetry Theories 
The results in Columns E through F and I through J in Table 3 also support 
our hypothesis that bank monitoring – as distinguished from resolution of 
information asymmetry – is at least partly responsible for improving firm 
value. 
The results in Columns C and D, comparing the period before the loan with 
the period during the loan, are consistent with both a monitoring theory and an 
information asymmetry theory.  An increase in a firm’s Tobin’s Q during the 
loan period as compared to the preceding period may be explained by the 
market’s initial revaluation of the firm in light of the new information 
conveyed by the bank’s lending decision.  Or, the value added by bank 
monitoring over the term of the loan could explain the increase in Tobin’s Q. 
However, the results in Columns E and F, comparing the periods during and 
after the loan, are best explained by the monitoring theory.  The drop in 
Tobin’s Q with the loan’s retirement can be explained by the absence of the 
bank monitor, but it is not likely a result of any new information revealed by 
the loan’s retirement.127  To the extent that a bank’s lending decision conveys a 
positive signal to the market regarding, for example, the firm’s growth 
 
126 According to our coding convention, a firm’s loan indicator variable is set to 1 only in 
years when the firm had a bank loan for all twelve months.  Therefore, our control here 
operates as to the year that is two years prior to the year that our loan indicator is first 
triggered. 
127 The suggestion has been made that a loan’s retirement without renewal may signal the 
bank’s assessment that the firm lacks good projects.  However, it is far more likely that the 
firm merely chose alternative financing, probably in the form of public debt, which is 
cheaper than private debt above a certain issue size.  Krishnaswami, supra note 65, at 419-
22.  Firms may borrow in private debt markets until they establish a good credit history, at 
which point they turn to cheaper public debt.  Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and 
Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 
689, 690 (1991) (theorizing that firms may first build reputations as good borrowers in 
private debt markets before turning to public debt); Datta, supra note 9, at 448 (finding 
evidence consistent with Diamond’s reputation-building hypothesis by showing a negative 
association between the length of pre-existing bank-firm relationships and at-issue yield 
spreads for new public debt). 
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prospects or the promise of its projects, we have no reason to expect the 
direction of this signal to change simultaneously with the maturity of the loan. 
Finally, in Columns I and J, we run estimations seeking to isolate the 
potential monitoring effects of bank loans on firm value.  We borrow a strategy 
from Christopher James’ pathbreaking article on the uniqueness of bank 
loans.128  As earlier noted, James categorizes loans and other financings by 
stated purpose and compares abnormal stock returns across categories 
following the public announcements of the debt financings.  As between bank 
loans for debt refinancing and bank loans for capital expenditures, he finds no 
significant difference in stock price response.  He concludes that the positive 
abnormal returns from new bank loan announcements cannot be explained 
solely by an information asymmetry theory.129  While loans for capital 
expenditures may signal that the bank has private information about the firm’s 
growth prospects, refinancing loans convey no such signal.  The absence of 
any significant difference in stock price response to an announcement of these 
two different categories of loans implies that the information asymmetry 
theory offers at best an incomplete explanation. 
Like James, we divide our sample based on the purpose of each loan.  We 
measure the effects of only those loans least likely to offer new information to 
the public markets about the firm’s growth prospects or the quality of its 
projects.  Increases in Tobin’s Q associated with these “no-information” loans 
would strongly support a monitoring theory.  To identify these loans, we look 
to the loan’s primary purpose as indicated in the DealScan database.  We 
include only loans for working capital, debt repayment, and commercial paper 
backup purposes in our set of no-information loans.130  Working capital loans 
are typically used for the short-term financing of ordinary course purchases of 
inventory or other ordinary course operations.  Debt repayment loans simply 
refinance existing debt.  A commercial paper backup loan is a bank 
commitment that backstops the borrower’s outstanding commercial paper.131  
The loan commitment assures that the borrower can pay off its commercial 
paper coming due should it find itself unable to roll over or otherwise refinance 
the paper.  These types of loans seem to convey no strong positive information 
to public markets about the borrower firm’s growth prospects. 
 
128 See James, supra note 10. 
129 See id. at 228-29. 
130 Other purposes identified with significant numbers of loans in the DealScan database 
include general corporate, acquisition, capital expenditure, leveraged buyout, project 
finance, real estate, recapitalization, takeover, trade finance, and other. 
131 Commercial paper is a low-risk short-term money-market security that firms typically 
issue in order to manage working capital.  Maturities do not exceed nine months, and 
proceeds are typically used for current transactions and not long-term investments.  Because 
of their low-risk features, they are exempt from Securities Act registration.  Federal Reserve 
Board: About Commercial Paper, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/CP/about.htm 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2008). 
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We compare the effects of these no-information loans to firm-years in which 
there is no loan.  For our models in Columns I and J, our sample includes only 
firm-years where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s only loan(s) 
are no-information loans.  We ignore all other firm-years – i.e., firm-years in 
which a firm has a loan other than a no-information loan.  Consistent with 
James’ findings, our fixed-effect estimations show positive and significant 
coefficients on the loan indicator, demonstrating that no-information loans are 
associated with increases in Tobin’s Q.132  This result offers further support for 
our hypothesis that bank loans enhance firm value because of the monitoring 
that banks perform.133 
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest it is unlikely that our results are 
explained by reverse causality or selection bias where only high-valued firms 
get loans.  Our results also discount the possibility that an omitted factor is 
responsible both for firms obtaining loans and increases in Tobin’s Q.  
Moreover, our results are also consistent with our claim that the loan indicator 
is not just a proxy for the existence of good projects, but that bank monitoring 
is at least partly responsible for the positive correlation between loans and firm 
value. 
Selection issues remain, however.  While we attempt to account for 
unobservable factors with controls and with our before-after approach looking 
at only Loan Firms, we are cautious about what this may tell us about non-
Loan Firms.  It is possible, for example, that unobservable differences exist 
between Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms, such that bank monitoring may only 
benefit Loan Firms.  The most convincing test of bank monitoring would 
require random assignment of loans across capital-raising firms.  Neither this 
sort of experiment nor a convincing natural experiment exists.  Accordingly, 
while our non-experimental analyses are imperfect, they represent the best 
analyses currently possible. 
D.   Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment and Free Cash Flow 
In this Section, we investigate the value-enhancing prospects for bank 
monitoring in specific contexts suggesting severe agency costs.  Bank 
monitoring may be especially important in these contexts.  We first consider 
agency costs induced by conventional corporate governance arrangements: we 
 
132 We also ran regressions estimating the effect of loans that would typically be 
considered “high-information loans”: loans for acquisitions, capital expenditures, equipment 
purchases, project finance, real estate, stock buyouts, and takeovers.  Unfortunately, there 
are only 672 observations in our sample where firms have loans only for these purposes.  
The results are statistically insignificant. 
133 This may not be definitive, of course.  While we believe, like James, that our no-
information loans convey little or no positive private information about the firm to the 
market, to the extent these loans do send a positive signal, our monitoring explanation is 
weaker.  See James, supra note 10, at 228-29. 
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explore bank monitoring in the face of managerial entrenchment.134  We then 
test the value of bank monitoring when firms have high free cash flow.135  
Finally, we address bank monitoring in the presence of both entrenchment and 
high free cash flow. 
1.  Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment 
In Table 4, we test the effect of bank monitoring on firm value in the 
presence of specific corporate governance arrangements.  GIM and BCF have 
shown a negative correlation between managerial entrenchment and firm 
value.136  We hypothesize that bank monitoring may mitigate the value-
decreasing effects of management entrenchment.  Banks’ continuing oversight 
of firms’ compliance with financial covenants and operating and investment 
restrictions may constrain managers despite the slack that entrenchment 
affords.  In Table 4, we interact our loan indicator with several measures of 
entrenchment.  The interaction allows us to observe not simply the effect of, 
say, the G-index on all firms (Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms), but to observe 
the effect of the G-index on Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms separately.  We 
include GIM’s G-Index (Cols. A & B), BCF’s E-Index (Cols. C & D), and a 
Poison Pill indicator (Cols. E & F).137  While we also test interactions between 
the loan indicator and the other provisions in BCF’s E-Index, none of these 
interactions are statistically significant, and we do not show the results in our 
tables. 
Although the total effect of the loan indicator is positive and significant in 
all specifications, and the measures of managerial entrenchment are negative 
and significant in all specifications, the interaction between bank loans and our 
governance indices do not show statistical significance.  The only significant 
interaction variable is the interaction between the loan indicator and the poison 
pill indicator in the absence of controls.  This suggests that the poison pill is 
the only entrenchment measure that affects firm value differently as between 
Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms.  The positive coefficient suggests that the 
presence of a loan may offset the value-decreasing effect of a poison pill.  This 
evidence is only weakly suggestive, but we have more to say about the 
interaction of bank monitoring with governance indices and individual 
entrenching provisions in Section 3 below. 
 
 
134 See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing entrenchment and its relation to agency costs). 
135 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the agency costs of free cash flow). 
136 See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 53; Gompers et al., supra note 2, 
at 120. 
137 The Poison Pill indicator is set to 1 when a firm has a poison pill.  See infra Part 
III.D.4 (discussing poison pills). 
  




Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Entrenchment Provisions 
Variable A B C D E F 
Loan Indicator 0.046 0.233 0.069 0.186* 0.021 0.162** 
 0.49 1.4 1.34 1.94 0.49 1.96 
G-index -0.041*** -0.038*     
 -3.74 -1.79     
Loan Indicator 0.004 -0.009     
* G-index 0.45 -0.52     
E-index   -0.075*** -0.073*   
   -3.71 -1.82   
 Loan Indicator   0.008 -0.016   
* E-index    0.43 -0.45   
Poison Pill     -0.262*** -0.211** 
     -5.98 -2.52 
Loan Indicator     0.11** -0.025 
* Poison Pill     2.22 -0.26 
Assets  -.00001***  -.00001***  -.00001*** 
  -3.27  -3.3  -3.58 
Firm Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  -1.21  -1.36  -0.86 
ROA  0.848***  0.841***  1.155*** 
  7.26  7.21  6.91 
CAPEX/Assets  2.578***  2.582***  2.968*** 
  4.62  4.62  5.19 
Leverage  0.926***  0.914***  0.888*** 
  7.37  7.28  5.98 
R&D per Sales  0.015***  0.015***  0.017*** 
   5.08  5.13  4.31 
Total Effect of 
Loan  
0.084*** 0.155*** 0.087*** 0.151*** 0.083*** 0.148*** 
Indicator 2.76 2.78 2.84 2.74 2.72 2.66 
Number of 
Observations 13710 6711 13710 6711 13710 6359 
R-squared 0.628 0.622 0.628 0.622 0.629 0.629 
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  We describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, 
along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2.  Columns A and B report 
estimations including an interaction between the G-index and the loan indicator; Columns C 
and D include an interaction between the E-index and the loan indicator; and Columns E 
and F include an interaction between the loan indicator and the Poison Pill indicator.  The 
total effect of the loan indicator on Tobin’s Q is the coefficient on the loan indicator plus the 
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coefficient on the interaction variable multiplied by the mean percentage of G-index/E-
index/Poison Pill, respectively.  Although not shown in the tables, year dummies and firm 
fixed effects are included in all regressions.  T-statistics appear below the coefficient 
estimates.  Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
2.  Interactions with Free Cash Flow 
Next, in Table 5 we explore the effect of bank loans and free cash flow on 
firm value.  We include free cash flow because it is one of the primary 
channels through which managers may act in their self-interest – spending free 
cash on perquisites or empire-building, for example – to the detriment of 
shareholders.138  The presence of a bank loan, however, may reduce these 
agency costs by monitoring managers’ use of discretionary funds.  Controlling 
for entrenchment with the G-index, we use interaction variables to determine 
whether the positive effect of bank monitoring on firm value is stronger in 
firms with higher free cash flow, where agency costs are potentially higher. 
For our measure of free cash flow, we use operating income minus interest 
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, scaled by the 
book value of the firm’s assets.  For estimations without interactions (Cols. A 
& B), the results indicate that, controlling for entrenchment, the loan indicator 
has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, while free cash flow is not 
statistically significant.  This is consistent with our earlier findings on the 
positive association between bank monitoring and firm value, though it says 
little about the effect of free cash flow.  However, when we include the 
interactions between free cash flow and the loan indicator (Cols. C & D), we 
find a negative coefficient on the independent free cash flow variable and a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term.  Together these coefficients 
suggest that: (a) when bank monitoring exists to control agency costs of free 
cash flow, free cash flow may improve firm value; but (b) in the absence of 
bank monitoring, the agency costs associated with free cash flow may reduce 
firm value.139  Finally, in the last two columns (Cols. E & F), we add a third 
interaction term, an indicator variable (“Top 1/3”) for the firms in our sample 
that rank in the top one-third in terms of free cash flow.  For these firms, the 
indicator is set to one, and it is set to zero otherwise.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on the triple interaction of the loan indicator, free cash 
flow, and Top 1/3 indicates that the positive effect of bank monitoring and free 
cash flow on firm value is especially strong for firms with higher free cash 
flow.  Overall, our results strongly suggest that bank monitoring interacts with 
 
138 See supra Part II.A.3 (defining free cash flow). 
139 In both these regressions and Columns E and F, the negative coefficient on the 
independent loan indicator variable is not meaningful, given these interactive models.  
Technically, it shows the effect of a loan when free cash flow is zero, which will never 
occur.  In any event, the total effect of the loan in each model is still positive, a result we 
have not included in the table. 
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free cash flow to enhance firm value.  This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that the value-enhancing effect of bank monitoring may matter most where 




Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow 
Variable A B C D E F 
Loan Indicator 0.087*** 0.149*** -0.273*** -0.23*** -0.243*** -0.194*** 
 2.81 2.7 -6.84 -3.24 -6.07 -2.74 
Free Cash  -0.122 -0.348 -0.458*** -0.926*** -0.443*** -0.891*** 
Flow  -1.54 -1.55 -5.57 -3.97 -5.4 -3.84 
Loan Indicator   3.075*** 3.398*** 1.624*** 1.544*** 
* Free Cash 
Flow 
  14.01 8.4 5.61 3.09 
Loan Indicator     1.884*** 2.739*** 
* Free Cash  
Flow * Top 1/3 
    7.65 6.3 
G-index -0.037*** -0.037* -0.037*** -0.036* -0.036*** -0.034* 
 -3.59 -1.86 -3.59 -1.82 -3.51 -1.7 
Assets  -.00001***  -.00001***  -.00001*** 
  -3.5  -3.74  -3.83 
Firm Age  -.0004  -.0003  -.0003 
  -0.62  -0.48  -0.54 
ROA  1.163***  1.18***  1.188*** 
  6.95  7.1  7.17 
CAPEX/Assets  2.957***  2.648***  2.446*** 
  5.16  4.65  4.3 
Leverage  0.891***  0.697***  0.72*** 
  5.99  4.67  4.83 
R&D per Sales  0.016***  0.009***  0.01** 
   4.24  2.41  2.51 
Firm fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 12833 6359 12833 6359 12833 6359 
R-squared 0.637 0.629 0.643 0.633 0.645 0.636 
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  We describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, 
along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2.  We add free cash flow 
measures to the estimations reported in this table, where our measure of free cash flow is 
calculated as operating income minus the sum of the following components: (a) total income 
taxes minus the change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year; (b) 
gross interest expenses on debt; (c) dividend payments on preferred stocks; and (d) dividend 
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payments on common stocks.  This is divided by the firm’s book value of assets.  Columns 
A and B report estimations including the free cash flow measure; Columns C and D add an 
interaction between free cash flow and the loan indicator; Columns E and F add an 
additional interaction term between the loan indicator, free cash flow, and an indicator 
variable for firms with free cash flow in the top 1/3 of our sample.  Although not shown in 
the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions.  T-statistics appear below the 
coefficient estimates.  Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
3.  Interactions with Managerial Entrenchment and Free Cash Flow 
 The results from Table 5 above suggest that bank monitoring may improve 
managers’ use of discretionary cash to increase firm value.  In Tables 6 and 7, 
we explore the effects of bank loans, management entrenchment, and free cash 
flow on firm value.  We test for value-enhancing effects of bank loans, now in 
the context of specific entrenchment arrangements.  Specifically, we test for 
the effects of free cash flow on firm value for a given level of entrenchment, 
and then test to see whether the presence of a loan affects this interaction of 
free cash flow and management entrenchment.  We interact our bank loan 
indicator with free cash flow and various measures of management 
entrenchment.  In Table 6, for our measures of entrenchment we use our two 
governance indices – the G-index and E-index.  In Table 7, our measures of 
entrenchment are each of the six individual entrenchment provisions 
comprising the E-index. 
Our results in Table 6 support the findings of Table 5.  We find that for a 
given level of entrenchment, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring 
improves firm value.  In Columns A and B of Table 6, we see positive and 
significant coefficients on the interaction of free cash flow and the G-index, 
indicating that for a given governance quality, firm value increases with free 
cash flow.140  When we interact the loan indicator with free cash flow and the 
G-index, we similarly find a positive and significant relation to firm value.  
This suggests that for a given governance quality (a given level of 
entrenchment), free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring may improve 
firm value.  We obtain similar results in Columns C and D, where we use the 
E-index as our entrenchment measure, though in the model with full controls, 
the coefficient is insignificant. 
 
 
140 A recent empirical study finds evidence of a negative relationship between firm value 
and the interaction between free cash flow and managerial entrenchment.  Jianxin (Daniel) 
Chi & D. Scott Lee, The Conditional Nature of the Value of Corporate Governance 22 tbl.3 
(June 6, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Our specification differs 
somewhat from theirs.  In all of our estimations reported in Tables 6 and 7, we consistently 
find a positive and significant relationship between firm value and the interaction of free 
cash flow with our entrenchment measures. 
  




Bank Loans and Firm Value:  
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Governance Indices 
Variable A B C D 
Loan Indicator -0.145*** -0.055*** 0.01 0.117* 
 -3.54 -0.74 0.28 1.75 
Free Cash Flow -2.011*** -2.692*** -0.726*** -1.122*** 
 -6.94 -4.92 -8.1 -4.73 
G-index -0.073*** -0.072***   
 -6.58 -3.41   
Free Cash Flow *  
G-index  
0.243*** 0.284***   
 5.81 3.83   
Free Cash Flow * G- 
 
0.209*** 0.189***   
Index * Loan Indicator 8.52 4.18   
E-index   -0.166*** -0.17*** 
   -8.48 -4.36 
Free Cash Flow 
* E-index  
  0.759*** 0.973*** 
   11.25 8.08 
Free Cash Flow * E- 
 
  0.286*** 0.132 
Index * Loan Indicator   3.38 0.82 
Assets  -.00001***  -.00001*** 
  -3.75  -3.83 
Firm Age  -.0003  -.00032 
  -0.53  -0.52 
ROA  1.182***  1.068*** 
  7.1  6.42 
CAPEX/Assets  2.694***  2.607*** 
  4.72  4.58 
Leverage  0.626***  0.444*** 
  4.11  2.86 
R&D per Sales  0.012***  0.015*** 
   3.01  3.82 
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 12833 6359 12833 6359 
R-squared 0.643 0.633 0.643 0.635 
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  We describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, 
free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2.  This table reports estimations that 
include interactions between free cash flow and two governance indices (the G-index and E-
index) and among free cash flow, the governance indices, and the loan indicator.  In 
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Columns A and B, the governance index is GIM’s G-index.  In Columns C and D, the 
governance index is BCF’s E-index.  Although not shown in the tables, year dummies are 
included in all regressions.  T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates.  Significance 
levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
For estimations reported in Table 7, we use similar specifications, except 
that instead of a governance index, we interact using the six individual 
entrenchment provisions from the E-index.  Our results are largely consistent 
with those in Table 6.  Regarding interactions between free cash flow and 
individual entrenchment provisions, we find that firm value increases with free 
cash flow, given the presence of any of the following: a poison pill, a 
supermajority requirement for mergers, a staggered board, limits to bylaw 
amendments, and golden parachutes.  Coefficients are positive and significant 
in each model – with and without controls.  Only limits on charter amendments 
have no statistically significant interactive effect with free cash flow.  When 
we include the loan indicator in the interaction, we find positive and 
statistically significant interactions in the presence of staggered boards, poison 
pills (in the specification without the full set of controls), and golden 
parachutes (in the specification with the full set of controls).  These results 
suggest that with any of these three entrenching provisions, free cash flow in 
the presence of bank monitoring improves firm value. 
 
  




Bank Loans and Firm Value:  
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchent Provisions 
Variable A B C D E F 
Loan Indicator -0.008 0.112* 0.078** 0.153*** 0.017 0.07 
 -0.23 1.74 2.44 2.67 0.48 1.07 
Free Cash Flow -0.624*** -1.044*** -0.177** -0.432* -0.645*** -0.952*** 
 -7.2 -4.45 -2.18 -1.91 -7.36 -4.09 
Poison Pill -0.524*** -0.546***     
 -12.1 -7.0     
Free Cash Flow 2.16*** 2.716***     
* Poison Pill 10.61 7.94     
Free Cash Flow   1.258*** 0.49     
* Poison Pill  
*Loan Indicator 
4.98 1.07     
Supermajority   -0.121 -0.228   
for Merger   -1.49 -1.44   
Free Cash Flow    1.133*** 2.235***   
*Supermajority   2.87 2.66   
Free Cash Flow   0.402 -0.124   
*Supermajority 
*Loan Indicator 
  0.87 -0.14   
Staggered      -0.34*** -0.168 
Board     -4.91 -1.11 
Free Cash Flow     2.29*** 2.61*** 
* Staggered 
Board 
    11.07 7.27 
Free Cash Flow     0.911*** 1.055** 
*Staggered 
Board * Loan 
Indicator 
    3.57 2.18 
Firm fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full Set of 
Controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of 
Observations 12833 6359 12833 6359 12833 6359 
R-squared 0.644 0.635 0.637 0.629 0.643 0.634 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Bank Loans and Firm Value:  
Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchment Provisions 
Variable A B C D E F 
Loan Indicator 0.089*** 0.153*** 0.087*** 0.151*** 0.051 0.137** 
 2.81 2.72 2.79 2.7 1.48 2.21 
Free Cash Flow -0.223*** -0.422* -0.127 -0.342 -0.472*** -0.836*** 
 -2.72 -1.88 -1.59 -1.52 -5.51 -3.52 
Limits to  -0.336*** -0.442***     
Amend Bylaws -4.37 -2.98     
Free Cash Flow  1.514*** 2.278***     
* Limits to 
Amend Bylaws 
4.69 4.25     
Free Cash Flow -0.239 -0.32     
* Limits to 
Amend Bylaws 
*Loan Indicator 
-0.59 -0.36     
Limits to    -0.145 0.011   
Amend Charter   -0.91 0.03   
Free Cash Flow 
*  
  0.88 0.709   
* Limits to 
Amend Charter 
  0.9 0.34   
Free Cash Flow   -0.053 -0.594   
* Limits to 
Amend Charter 
*Loan Indicator 
  -0.05 -0.21   
Golden      -0.236*** -0.192*** 
Parachute      -6.04 -2.63 
Free Cash Flow     1.701*** 2.089*** 
* Golden 
Parachute 
    8.46 5.32 




    1.99 0.39 
Firm fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full set of 
Controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of 
Observations 12833 6359 12833 6359 12833 6359 
R-squared 0.637 0.63 0.636 0.628 0.64 0.631 
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  We describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, 
free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2.  This table reports estimations that 
include interactions between free cash flow and the three entrenchment provisions and 
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among free cash flow, the entrenchment provisions, and the loan indicator.  Although not 
shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions.  The full set of controls 
found in Tables 2 through 6 are included in the estimations reported in Columns B, D, and 
F, but omitted for brevity.  T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates.  Significance 
levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
4.  Strong Entrenchment: When Bank Monitoring May Matter Most 
Why might bank monitoring have this value-enhancing effect with free cash 
flow in the presence of these three entrenchment provisions, but not with the 
other entrenchment provisions that also merit inclusion in the E-index?  Again, 
it may be that bank monitoring matters most in situations with high agency 
costs.  These three provisions – staggered boards, poison pills, and golden 
parachutes – have direct relevance for managerial slack and entrenchment, 
while the others arguably do not. 
Our estimations involving the staggered board offer our strongest results for 
the value of bank monitoring.  Consistent with our high agency cost theory, the 
corporate governance literature recognizes the special potency of the staggered 
board as an entrenching device.141  An effective staggered board prevents the 
timely ouster of a majority of the firm’s board of directors, requiring even a 
majority of shareholders to wait through at least two annual elections to 
accomplish the task.142  This delay in gaining control of the firm strongly 
deters a proxy fight or other hostile takeover.  Moreover, Lucian Bebchuk and 
Alma Cohen offer empirical evidence suggesting that a staggered board 
reduces firm value.143  Similarly, the poison pill has been recognized as 
another potent entrenchment tool, especially when used in combination with a 
staggered board.144  A poison pill effectively precludes a hostile acquirer from 
purchasing a block of the target’s stock above some percentage threshold.145  It 
 
141 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Joan C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
887, 890 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards]; Bebchuk & Cohen, 
Entrenched Boards,  supra note 24, at 411.   
142 A staggered board is most effective when the firm’s governance arrangements do not 
permit shareholders to: (a) effect amendments that unstagger the board; (b) increase the 
number of board seats and fill them; or (c) remove directors without cause.  Our data do not 
distinguish among levels of effectiveness for staggered boards.  This only biases our sample 
against us, however. 
143 See Bebchuk & Cohen, Entrenched Boards, supra note 24, at 421-28. 
144 See id. at 412 (“Staggered boards also protect incumbents from removal via a hostile 
takeover because of the interaction between incumbents and a board’s power to adopt and 
maintain a poison pill.”); Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 141, at 904. 
145 Some have cautioned not to overrate the presence of a pill, since a firm without a pill 
can always adopt one without shareholder approval, even in the face of a hostile bid.  John 
C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 337 (2000).  So even a firm without a pill is protected by a 
“shadow pill.”  Id.  On the other hand, whether a pill is in place or not may have a signaling 
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does this by diluting the value of the acquirer’s stock in the target firm once the 
percentage threshold is reached.146  The standard maneuver to defeat a pill is to 
obtain control of the board in order to redeem the pill.  But an effective 
staggered board prevents this approach.  So, together the pill and the staggered 
board offer very strong entrenchment.147 
The golden parachute operates a bit differently from these other two devices 
in creating agency costs.  A golden parachute promises incumbent managers a 
handsome payout upon a change of control of the firm.  The parachute in effect 
offers a soft landing for ousted executives.  Unlike other “entrenching” 
provisions, the parachute generates agency costs not by insulating managers 
from the takeover market, but by easing their transition to unemployment.  By 
reducing the sting of takeover market discipline, the parachute may encourage 
managerial slack.148 
By comparison, for three provisions of the E-index – supermajority voting 
for mergers, limits to by-law amendments, and limits to charter amendments – 
the joint interactions with free cash flow and the loan indicator in Table 7 
produce no significant results.  This lack of results might be explained by the 
fact that these three provisions are in some sense second-order entrenchment 
devices that do not by themselves directly protect managers from hostile 
takeovers.  Limits to by-law and charter amendments do not directly enable 
managerial slack.  Instead, they prevent shareholder modification of other 
provisions – namely, staggered boards and poison pills – that do directly 
entrench managers by shielding them from capital market discipline.  
Similarly, a supermajority voting requirement for mergers seems of secondary 
importance for entrenchment purposes because shareholders would only get to 
vote on a merger proposal after its approval by the board.  Therefore, a 
supermajority requirement would matter in a hostile takeover context only if 
management lost control of the board – i.e., if the staggered board were 
 
effect to potential acquirers.  A pill in place may signal the board’s determination to fight 
any hostile bid, while the absence of a pill – or the removal of an existing pill – may signal 
management’s “softness” to a potential acquirer.  Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 
29, at 10.  The shadow pill phenomenon may partly explain why we do not obtain stronger 
results in the interaction of free cash flow, poison pill, and the loan indicator.  See pp. 1035-
1036 tbl.7 cols.A & B. 
146 The dilution is effected by issuing rights to all stockholders to purchase securities – 
typically of the target but sometimes of the acquirer – at steep discounts once the acquirer’s 
stock holdings in the target exceed the specified percentage threshold.  The rights may be 
exercised by all stockholders except the unwanted acquirer. 
147 The empirical results of Brown and Caylor confirm that the absence of staggered 
boards and poison pills is important for firm value.  See Brown & Caylor, supra note 32, at 
422. 
148 Of course, this may benefit shareholders to the extent it renders management more 
amenable to a takeover.  Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 
884 (2002). 
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ineffective at preventing a loss of control.  Supermajority requirements, then, 
offer only a “second line of defense.”149 
In general, our results are consistent with the idea that free cash flow with 
strong entrenchment may present a situation where bank monitoring matters 
most.  That is, bank oversight of managers’ use of discretionary funds may add 
the most value when agency costs are highest – when strong entrenchment 
would otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our study is the first to integrate into the empirical corporate governance 
literature a careful consideration of the effects of bank monitoring for reducing 
agency costs.  Using the established measure of Tobin’s Q for firm value, we 
find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that bank monitoring adds value.  
Controlling for the G-index and for potential simultaneity, we find a positive 
and significant relation between firm value and the presence of a bank loan.  
This suggests that bank monitoring may help counteract the value-decreasing 
effect of managerial entrenchment.  In addition, using measures of free cash 
flow to differentiate companies with high agency costs, we find that bank 
monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm value.  Finally, we 
investigate interactions among our loan indicator, free cash flow, and various 
measures of governance quality.  Our results suggest first that, for a given 
quality of corporate governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank 
monitoring improves firm value.  Second, differentiating among E-index 
provisions, we find results consistent with our claim that bank monitoring may 
matter most when strong entrenchment would otherwise encourage managers 
to squander free cash – i.e., when agency costs are high. 
More generally, our findings strongly suggest that corporate governance 
may involve more than just corporate law.  Contracting parties may share an 
interest with shareholders in controlling managerial agency costs.  Bank 
monitoring may perform such a function even outside the confines of financial 
distress.  Bank governance may substitute for conventional modes of corporate 
governance.  This potential for bank monitoring as a governance device has 
important implications in a number of areas. 
A.  Reconceptualizing Regulation of Creditors and Credit Markets 
A fundamental rethinking may be in order for various legal doctrines and 
regulatory structures that affect bank lending and banks’ exercise of their 
creditor remedies.  Every few decades, for example, court-created doctrines 
arise to protect borrowers through equitable policing of bank collection 
efforts.150  Lender liability became a big concern for bankers in the 1980s,151 
 
149 Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 29, at 9. 
150 See generally Jonathan M. Landers, Deepening Insolvency Comes of Age, N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 5, 2006 (describing a history of court-created doctrines to protect borrowers ex post). 
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despite the fact that in only a handful of egregious cases did courts actually pin 
liability on a bank.152  Now in the 2000s, the confused doctrine of deepening 
insolvency has been recognized by at least a few courts as a separate cause of 
action against a lender.153  To the extent these doctrines impede banks from 
exercising their contract remedies, the doctrines may tend to reduce firm value 
in the aggregate.  A given firm may be spared the scythe, but overall, impeding 
creditor collection may simply facilitate managerial slack.154  Further empirical 
research may show this to be the case. 
Similarly, regulatory changes that affect the availability of bank credit may 
potentially affect firm value, not simply by affecting financing options but by 
affecting the availability of bank monitoring for public companies.155  A whole 
host of other regulatory structures might also indirectly affect the efficacy of 
bank monitoring for borrower firm value.  As noted earlier, for example, risk 
diversification by lead banks may reduce their incentive to monitor.156  
Deepening loan markets and markets for credit derivatives offer banks the 
ability to shed risk.  Regulatory intervention in these markets that affect banks’ 
risk diversification strategies may therefore indirectly affect borrower firm 
values by altering bank monitoring incentives.  These many regulatory areas 
deserve further attention from researchers and policy makers.157 
 
151 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 143-44 
(1989). 
152 See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761-62 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(imposing a duty of good faith on the lender in demanding repayment, and finding that the 
lender had an obligation to give notice before refusing to advance funds under a line of 
credit). 
153 In re Exide Technologies, Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 750-52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) 
(upholding a deepening insolvency claim against the debtors’ secured lenders for causing 
the debtors to fraudulently continue operating the business long after the debtors should 
have been liquidated); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R. F. Lafferty & 
Co., 267 F.2d 340, 349 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding an independent cause of action against firm 
managers and third parties for improperly expanding corporate debt and prolonging the life 
of an insolvent company).  As happened with lender liability, however, courts appear to be 
abandoning the cause of action for deepening insolvency.  Hugh M. McDonald, Todd S. 
Fishman & Laura Martin, Lafferty’s Orphan: The Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 26, 2008, at 1. 
154 Cf. Fischel, supra note 151, at 151 (commenting that imposition of extracontractual 
duties upon lenders encourages borrower opportunism). 
155 For example, reserve requirements are set by the Federal Reserve in order to assure 
bank solvency.  Reserve requirements specify the amount of funds that a depository 
institution must hold in reserve against its deposit liabilities.  Ceretis parabis, a higher 
reserve requirement means less bank lending overall. 
156 See supra Part II.B.2. 
157 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy 1 (Dec. 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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B.  Implications for Future Research 
The design of empirical corporate governance research should account for 
bank governance.  Otherwise, results may be biased.  In addition, further 
investigation of interactions among bank loans, various governance 
arrangements, and firm characteristics may prove fruitful.  We have taken a 
first step in this direction, but many questions remain. 
More generally, bank governance itself has been understudied.  We have 
proffered initial evidence that bank monitoring is associated with increases in 
firm value.  Further exploration of the details of bank lending arrangements 
may help identify specific loan terms – specific covenants or reporting 
obligations, for example – that may be especially important for effective bank 
monitoring.  Optimal loan terms for this purpose may vary by industry or other 
firm characteristics.158 
Finally, besides bank loans, other important sources of contract governance 
and monitoring may exist.  Researchers have suggested, for example, that 
insurers of directors’ and officers’ liability risk may be effective monitors.159  
Other firm contracts may also include monitoring arrangements that not only 
protect the particular contracting party but also improve firm value.  Labor 
agreements and major supply contracts, for example, may be fruitful targets for 
empirical research. 
* * * 
We know that corporate law matters.  We also know a fair bit about which 
specific corporate governance provisions matter.  But what else matters?  Our 
article takes a first step in answering this important but underappreciated 
question.  Bank monitoring may serve an important governance function, 
improving firm value by constraining managerial slack that eludes 
conventional corporate governance arrangements. 
 
 
158 One study finds, for example, that small firms generally have weaker corporate 
governance provisions than large firms.  See Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 32, at 3.  
Different types of firms may also be differentially affected by particular loan arrangements 
for purposes of improving firm value. 
159 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
